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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The goal was to de-
tennine if coverage was balanced and fair_;t.o both parties in the con-
-
flict, Arabs and Israelis. 
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tion to my dissertation adviser, Dr. William R. Steng, Associate Profes-
sor in the School of Journalism and Broadcasting. I have been associated 
with Dr. Steng since the time I was a Master's degree student in the 
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helpful and has guided me with great understanding. Dr. Steng proved to 
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all that he has done for me. 
My appreciation to Dr. Walter J. Ward, Professor in the School of 
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tion of this dissertation. 
In addition, I would like.to thank the other members of my commit-
tee, Dr. Thomas Karman, Professor and Head of the Department of Higher 
Education, Dr. Robert Kamm, Professor of Higher Education and Past Pre-
sident of Oklahoma State University; and Dr. Ivan Chapman, Professor of 
Sociology. I am greatful for the patience and assistance of these men in 
completing my study. 
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had to be patient to let me complete my dissertation work. My parents, 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Study 
A wave of anti-Semitism is sweeping the world as a reaction 
against 1) Jewish control of news channels, 2) international 
Jewish banking, 3) atheistic communism, which was originally 
spawned in Jewish capitalism and Jewish intellectualism.1 
Rev. Gerald B. Winrod (1940) 
11 During your entire life have you felt that the Arabs (of 
Israel) were the enemies of the state? 11 
11 Yes. 11 
11 You felt they were a potential fifth column? 11 
11 Yes. 11 2 
Statement of a witness, cross-
exami ned by the Defense in !a 
1957 massacre trial, Jerusalem. 
Anti-Semitism did not perish with Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. 
The persecution of Jews continued as it had for centuries. Churchmen 
spoke of the accursed Jews. Jews still are considered misers and: 
clannish. In the 1950s, anti-Semitic incidents, such as desecration of 
Jewish synagogues, vandalism of Jewish homes and physical torture of 
Jews, occurred in Europe and the United States. 
lcharles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and An~i-
Semitism (Harper and Row, Publishers, New York and London, 1966),i p. 107. 
2walter Schwarz, The Arabs in Israel (Faber and Faber, London, 
1959), p. 12. 
1 
2 
In the 1980s a nation of Jews seems to engage in a type of 
persecution which their ancestors faced decades ago. The tables have 
turned and the Israelis seem to be engaging in some kind of persecution 
of the Arabs, especially those who are Palestinians. 
Who are Arabs? The British geographer W. B. Fisher, in his book, 
The Middle East: A Physical Social and Regional Geography, states,: 
From the point of view of the anthropologist, it is impossible 
to speak with accuracy either of an Arab or of a Semitic 
people. Both terms connote a mixed population varying widely 
in physical character and in racial origin, and are best used 
purely as cultural and linguistic terms respectively. Thus the 
so-called 11 Arab countries are those which share a common 
culture. 
Currently the Arab countries are: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen Arab Republic, South Yemen, 
Kuwait, a series of tiny sheikhdoms along the Persian Gulf, and 
the North African states known collectively as the Mehgreb-
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. Islam is the predominant 
religion in all of these countries and strict adherence to 
Islam is an important element of the Arab world.3 
This study focused on Palestinian Arabs. 
The Palestinians have been subject to harassment by Jews since the 
es tab 1 i shment of the state of Israel in 1948. According to Rosemary 
Sagigh, a writer who interviewed a number of Palestinians, these oppres-
sed people deserve as much world concern as other oppressed people of the 
world. She wrote: 
Few people would now dispute that the greatest victims of the 
establishment of the state of Israel have been the Palestin-
ians. As a people displaced from control of their resourcesi by 
force, deprived of their national territory and identity, con-
demned to minority status in the countries of others, Palest1in-
ians claim the same right of concern from the world as other 
oppressed peoples.4 
3congress i onal Quarterly, The Middle East (Congressional Qua:rterly, 
Washington, DC., 1974), p. 36. 
4Rosemary Sagigh~ Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutiona!ries (Zed Press, London, 1~79), p. 5. 
3 
The world today seems to be concerned with the rights of th~ Pales-
tine people. Maybe a tragedy in the form of massacres and exodusles of 
I 
Palestine Arabs in the recent past has created this concern. Whatever 
may be the cause, the fact is that the Middle East nations and thle United 
States are pursuing serious efforts to solve the issue of a Paleitine 
homeland. 
Statement of the Problem 
This study is concerned with the coverage of the Arab-Israel con-
fl i ct between June 1982 and February 1983 by The New York Times and the 
St. Louis Post Dispatch. The following questions were asked duri1ng the 
study of news stories published about the conflict: J.!! .... ~!rn.t l_ig_h!t did 
The New York Times and the St. Louis.Post Dispatch portray the Arabs and 
the Israelis? To which did either newspaper direct 3-.~.r.e. attentj.Q!!J? The 
military side of the conflict or the cau_~f the conflict, such as the 
_ .... ~ .... -
Palestinian quest for a homeland? ~~ich aspect of the Arabs and 1the 
Israelis did either newspaper emphasize? Successes or failures?' In what 
dimension were the Arabs and the Israelis portrayed by the two 
newspapers? 
' There is a great difference between discussing facts and dealing 
I 
with them.5 The purpose of this study, basically, was to deal wiith facts 
!~;~_;·:·· 
and how they were presented in two U.S. newspa~ers. 
The study examined llwhat II the two newspapers reported in theli r 
coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and specifically in what l~ght the 
Arabs and Israelis were portrayed before, during and after the Be~ rut 
5Roger Fisher, Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs (Harper and Row, 
Publishers, New York, London, 1972), p. 1. 
I 
4 
massacre. Content analysis was used to achieve this purpose. As Pool 
said: 
Someone says something somehow to someone with some effect. 
The fundamental questions, therefore, are:~q 1 says what 2 _ 
how, to whom, with what effect? When studies are focused upon 
11 who, 11 we speak of control analysis; when they deal primarily 
with 11what 11 , it is content analysis.6 ----·------·--·· 
--To the knowledge of this writer, only a few content analysis studies 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict's news coverage have been conducted in the 
United States. By content analysis, this study has attempted to show 
that news coverage, which is supposed to be objective, may be affected by 
a major event of international consequence. 
Limitations and Assumption of the Study 
This writer believes that one major limitation of the study is its 
restricted scope. An examination of only a segment of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is being made --the press side of the conflict. But what about 
the effect of the news coverage on the reader? Answers about the effect 
of news coverage on the reader can be provided by questionnaire surveys. 
The study suffers from one major assumption. By selecting The New 
York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, this writer has assumed that 
some changes may have occurred in the coverage of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict by these two newspapers. In other words, these two newspapers were 
part of the study because this writer believed there was reasonable 
chance of finding changes in their news coverage. 
'."· 61thiel de Sola Pool, The Prestige Press: A Comparative Study of 
Political Symbols (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952), 
lP· 11. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Ancient Israel 
Get thee out of thy country and from thy kindred and from thy 
father's house onto a land that I will show thee; and I will 
make of thee a great nation; and I will bless thee and make thy 
name great, and thou shalt be a blessing.I 
With these words, known to have come from God, the migration of the 
patriarch Abraham to the land of Canaan was given a divine sanction. 
Abraham, the nomad chieftain, left Ur, a Persian Gulf city in southern 
Babylonia, and traveled in search of the "Promised Land" and arrived in 
the land of Canaan. 
These 11 Hebrews, 11 who entered Egypt, settled in the land of G1osha in 
the Nile Delta. After generations of peaceful existence they were en-
slaved by an overly zealous pharaoh, probably Ramses II. After Ramses' 
death, they were led out of bondage by Moses. Their deliverance from 
Egypt, the Exodus, was regarded in later Heb.rew thought as an eve
1
nt of 
primary religious significance.2 
Moses' successor, the mighty warrior Joshua, led his forces across 
the Jordan to besiege and capture Jericho and other Canaanite stnong-
holds. He was a skillful leade.r. The invasion he began was continued by 
!Theodore Huebener and Carl Herman Voss, This is Israel 
(Philosophical Library, New York 1956), p. 1. 
21bid, p. 3. 
5 
6 
others through more than a century of bloody warfare. The Hebrews 
streamed into the land and settled it, driving out or subjugating the 
natives. 
The land where the Hebrews settled later became known as Palestine. 
It was ruled by Persians until 333 B.C. when it was conquered by 
Alexander. Palestine was taken over in 636 by Omar, the second 
Mohammedan Caliph. 
Palestine Under the Moslems 
On September 20, 622, the Prophet Mohammed fled from Mecca to 
Medina. This flight, known as the Hegira, is a milestone in Islamic his-
tory, marking as it does the beginning of the prophet's power and of the 
Mohammedan era. During the eleven years from the Hegira to his death, 
Mohammed welded the scattered Arab tribes into one people. Palestine was 
ruled by several Caliphs after Mohammed and Islam spread during their 
reign, winning converts from Christianity and Judaism. 
For two centuries following the Arab conquest, Palestine remained a 
prosperous country with blooming vineyards and busy towns. This 
prosperity was slowly but steadily undermined by the inefficient· 
administration of the Caliphs, burdensome taxation, and a lack oi 
protection from marauding adventurers. Palestine was not well protected; 
and in the ninth century insurrections broke out. The Bedouins made 
frequent raids. Towns were sacked; villages were burned; monasteries and 
I 
churches were destroyed. 
More and more the Caliphs in Baghdad began to rely on Turkish 
mercenaries to maintain order. This tactic weakened their 
power as they became little more than figureheads. Ambitiou~ 
local governors made themselves hereditary princes and 
completely disregarded Baghdad.3 
7 
What followed the weakening of Moslem rule in Palestine was the 
Turkish Conquest. A Turkish adventurer named Mohammed ibn-Tughj seized 
control of Egypt, Palestine and Syria. Palestine, in 1291, becam;e a pro-
vince of the realm of Sultan of Egypt and remained so until 1516 when the 
land became part of the Ottoman Empire. 
Under the Ottoman Turks, the government of Palestine was org~nized 
along feudal lines.· Local governors were appointed from Constantinople 
where the revenues were sent. 
However, the Turkish government took no special interest in 
Palestine except to exploit it. Through misrule, corruption, burdensome 
taxation and wasteful use of land, the country's natural resources were 
destroyed. Palestine became barren, with an ignorant, poverty-stricken 
population eking out a miserable existence. The peasants were oppressed 
and suffered from the intermittent skirmishes of local sheiks. 
Palestine by the 1830s had become mostly Islamic in population. 
This was one country which had experienced the influence of several re-
ligions over the centuries, domination by Jews, Christians and Moslems. 
The Palestine Question 
Dear Dr. Dunner: 
I fear Palestine could never support all the Jews and the 
Arabs would start a constant war if all of them came. Why c~n't 
3Heubener and Voss, p. 3. 
Jews be members of a religious body but natives of the lands in 
which they 1 i ve? 
Very Sincerely Yours, 
Eleanor Roosevelt 
January 16, 19434 
8 
Mrs. Roosevelt may have stated in one paragraph the still unanswered 
Palestine question. The homeland of the Palestinian people has been as 
elusive as a mirage in the desert. Historians, politicians and political 
analysts have taken sides on which p_arty is right, whether the Jews drove 
the Palestinians from their homeland or whether the Jews have the legiti-
mate right to the land they now call Israel. 
By the early 1900s, Palestine was home fo~more than 700,000 Arabs. 
Their ancestors once had commanded a domain stretching from Spain to 
.•. 
Si am. Now they were subjects of the Ottoman Empire ruled by fel 1 ow 
Moslem Turks. 
There were a few more than 50,000 Jews living in Palestine in 1900. 
Many were descendants of families who had lived there for generations, 
with generally far less difficulties than their European cousins faced on 
the continent. Ohters came in the late nineteenth century trying to 
escape the vicious pograms that spread through much of eastern Europe. 
Few of them arrived with any plans to reshape the political structure, 
but in the early part of the twentieth century many became converts to 
Zionism. 
A definition of Zionism is imperative at this stage. Jacob Tsur 
wrote: 
Zionism is the Jewish people's movement of national liberation. 
4Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., New York, London, Toronto, 1950), p. ix. 
As such, it constitutes an integral part of the historic 
process of the emancipation of nations which commenced in the 
first half of the nineteenth century with the outbreak of 
national revolutions in the Balkans and culminated in the 
emergence of independent states throughout Asia and Africa 
after World War II.5 
9 
A few Islamic nationalists in Palestine viewed the Zionists in their 
land as possible allies in fighting Ottoman domination. However, they 
also were aware that the growing Jewish population would eventually be 
able to gain control of government affairs in the country, excluding the 
Arabs from power. In this context, Kenneth Ray Bain wrote: 
It took little political acumen to realize that Zionism's call 
for a state run by Jews made no sense unless the children of 
Israel planned wither to wrench political po~er from the Arab 
Palestinians or drive them from their homes. 0 
The Ottoman Empire, which was allied with Germany, broke up during 
World War I. The Jews and Moslems never did become allies to fight 
British domination. "Violent conflicts between Zionists and Moslems 
became a permanent feature of the Holy Land. 11 7 
After the cessation of hostilities in World War I, the British had 
occupied Palestine, and the Supreme Allied Council awarded to Britain a 
mandate for that country at the San Remo Conference in April 1920. In 
1922, the League of Nations approved the mandate with the provisions that 
Britain should create a Jewish national state. This stipulation assumed 
that Britain would facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
During the 1930s, with Jewish immigration on the rise, Arabs feared 
5Jacob Tsur, Zionism (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
1977), p. 9. 
6Kenneth Ray Bain, The March to Zion (Texas A & M University Press, 
College Station and London, 1979), pp. 5-6. 
7Ibid, p. 6. 
10 
Jews would overrun Palestine. In 1936 Arabs rioted to voice their dis-
pleasure, whereupon the British appointed an official investigatihg body, 
the Peal Commission, to look into the causes of unrest. In 1937, it 
recommended the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish, the 
I 
other Arab. Continued Arab disturbances in 1938 compelled the Br~tish 
Foreign Office to issue in 1939 the famous White Paper, a document that 
aimed at appeasing the Arabs by repudiating the Balfour Declaration and 
restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 during the next 
five years. 
In early 1947, Arab and Zionist representatives met in London to 
resolve the Palestine question but failed to do so. Britain then turned 
to the United Nations. The United Nations set up an inquiry committee 
which ultimately recommended that Palestine be divided into two separate 
! 
states, Arab and Jewish, with Jerusalem and vicinity as an international 
zone under permanent United Nations trusteeship. 11The United States and 
Soviet Union agreed on the partitioning of Palestine, and on Nov. 29, 
1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted to divide Palestine 11 .8 
Civil war broke out shortly after the U.N. decision. In March 1948, 
the United States voiced opposition to the forcible partitioning ~f 
Palestine and called for suspension of the plan. The United States urged 
a special session of the General Assembly. 
In April 1948, the Security Council adopted a U.S. resolutio~ call-
ing for a truce and a special session of the General Assembly. But it 
was too late to stop the division of Palestine. On May 14, the British 
I high commissioner left Palestine and the state of Israel was proclaimed. 
8congressional Quarterly, p. 13. 
11 
After the state of Israel was proclaimed, a committee of legal 
experts was appointed to draft a constitution for the new state. The 
experts drafted a simple pattern of government combining certain aspects 
of the United States Constitution with some of the essentials of the 
Continental European parliamentary system. 
The legislature consists of one house, the Chamber of Deputies, 
rather than two houses, as in the United States, Great Britain 
and other democratic countries. As in Great Britain, the 
Cabinet or Executive Council, headed by the Prime Minister, is 
chosen from and is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. The 
President of the Republic is elected by the legislature for a 
fixed term of oftice and his functions are mainly of an 
honorary nature. 
Following is an excerpt from the draft constitution: 
The official name of the state of Israel is Israel. It is the 
National Home of the whole Jewish people. All citizens of 
Israel, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, enjoy equal civic and 
political rights. No citizen shall be at a disadvantage as a 
candidate for public office or employment or in the matter of 
promotion, on account of his race, religion, language or sex. 
While Hebrew is the official language, adequate facilities must 
be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their lan-
guage in the legislature, before the Courts and before the ex-
ecutive authorities. Citizenship is conferred on all residents 
of Israel over the age of eighteen who were Palestinian citi-
zens on May 15, 1948, as well as on Jews who were not citizens 
of Palestine on that date but are residents in the area of 
Israel 11 at the time of the enactment of this constitution" or 
residents of the non-Israeli portion of Palestine opting for 
citizenship of Israel within one year.10 
After Israel was created, it became a focal point of Jews escaping 
religious persecution in Central and Eastern Europe, especially Russia 
and Germany. But peace did not reign in the land. 
Ever since May 15, 1948, Israel and the Arabs have been techni-
cally at war. Seen from the perspective of the past 22 years, 
9Dunner, p. 117. 
lOibid., pp. 117-118. 
this state of affairs has been marked by three major clashes 
and innumerable smaller battles, centered on the Jordanian and 
Egyptian fronts.11 
War of Independence (1948-49) 
The first Arab-Israeli war stemmed from Arab refusal to accept a 
12 
United Nation Pl~n to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish 
states. The armies of five Arab countries -- Egypt, TransJordan, Iraq, 
Syria and Lebanon -- invaded Israel one day after the state was 
established on May 15, 1948 (Figure 1). They were defeated. 
Although the Arab states involved had 40 times as many people as the 
infant Jewish state, the Arabs, torn by dynastic rivalries, never placed 
their armies under effective joint command and were unable to agree on 
common objectives. 
Harry B. Ellis, Christian Science Monitor correspondent, wrote: 
Often Arab units in the line were given faulty equipment and 
had no sense of unified support from their governments at home. 
Most Arab soldiers involved never had seen Palestine and were 
far more concerned with scrabbling out a hard living at home 
than with the plight of Arabs in the Holy Land. Jewish 
soldiers by contrast, had their backs to the sea, with fresh 
memories of the Nazi terror in Europe. Furthermore, they had a 
military tradition dating back to 1920, when Haganah 
("defense") was founded.12 
Haganah was transformed into the Defense Army and had approximately 
20,000 men and women. It became a tightly-disciplined fighting force, 
with a central authority to direct training and to purchase arms. Arms 
and ammunition were imported from abroad, chiefly from Czechoslovakia. 
I 
I 
The war stopped on January 7, 1949, and by February 24 Egypt had 
11Harry B. Ellis, The Dilemma of Israel (American Enterprise!, 
Institute, 1970), p. 29. , 
12Ibid. 
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14 
separately signed an armistice agreement with Israel, followed by Lebanon 
in March; Jordan in April and Syria in July. Iraq refused to sign an 
armistice and simply withdrew from Palestine. Although the Arabs 
withdrew troops from Israel, they never did admit defeat. Their attitude 
at the end of the 1948 war was to be a reflection of their attituoe for 
years to come. The Arabs seemed to view Jews as their lifelong enemies, 
and statements by Arab leaders indicated a struggle was to continue with 
no apparent end. Azzam Pasha, First Secretary General of the Arab 
League, said in an interview: 
We have a secret weapon which we can use better than guns and 
machine guns, and this is time. As long as we do not make , 
peace with the Zionists, the war is not over; and as long as 
the war is not over there is neither victor nor vanquished. As 
soon as we recognize the existence of the state of Israel, w~ 
admit by this act that we are vanquished.lJ 
Suez War ( 1956) 
The nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, by Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser was a primary step because of several events 
in the previous year: the British had withdrawn their 80,000 trooops from 
the Suez Canal Zone; the Soviet Union agreed to supply large quantitites 
of arms to Egypt on advantageous terms, and the United States had 
cancelled its offer to help Egypt build the Aswan Dam. Diplomatic1 
efforts to settle the Suez Canal Crisis failed. Britain and France, who 
were chief shareholders in the Suez Canal Company, tried to recapture the 
Canal by force and enlisted Israel 1 s participation in this effort.'. 
On October 26, 1956, the Israeli army invaded the Sinai Penins
1
ula 
and in seven days had reached the Suez Canal. Egyptian troops wer~ 
I 
13congressional Quarterly, p. 42. 
driven from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. On October 31, French and 
British air forces began bombing Egypt prior to invading the counitry. 
The United Nations speedily achieved a cease-fire and demanded the 
withdrawal of troops invading Egypt. 
15 
Responding to intense international pressure from the United States, 
the Soviet Union, Britain and France withdrew the last of their forces 
from Egypt in December 1956. 
The last Israeli units were not withdrawn from Sinai until Miarch 
1957 and then only under the threat that the United States would impose 
economic sanctions upon Israel if it failed to withdraw.14 
I 
The 1956 war did not solve the Arab-Israeli territorial conflict. 
According to Nadav Safran, author of From War to War, the conflict after 
the war became a 11 clash of destinies" following the merger of Egypt and 
Syria in the United Arab Republic in February 1958. Safran wrote: 
Prior to the Union with Syria, Egypt, along with the rest of 
the Arab League, stood for the application of the United 
Nations resolutions on partition and the return of the refug~-
es, which admitted the right of Israel to exist; after the · 
union, this line was abandoned for one that clearly intimated 
the liquidation of Arab rights in Palestlne or the liquidation 
of the Zionist aggression in Palestine.I 
Six Day War (1967) 
Egyptian President Nasser played a role in yet another Arab-Israeli 
' 
conflict, when he declared the blockade of the Gulf of Agaba on May 23, 
1967. Failure of diplomatic efforts to lift the blockade was the primary 
cause of the Six Day War of June 5-10, 1967 (Figure 2). 
14Ibid., p. 43. 
15Ibid. 
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The Gulf had been opened to Israeli shipping by Israel's victory in 
the Suez war of 1956, and it had been kept open by the United Nations 
Emergency Force stationed since then at the Gulf's mouth on the Red Sea. 
Nasser's request on May 18 for removal of the U.N. force, from the Gaza 
Strip as well as from the gulf outpost, was accompanied by movemeht of 
substantial Egyptian forces into the Sinai Peninsula, raising Tel:Aviv 1 s 
fears of the long-threatened Arab attempt to terminate the existence of 
the Jewish state. When the United States and other Western nations 
failed to act promptly to break the blockade, the third Arab-Israeli war 
began. 
After this war, Israel found itself in a strong position. During 
the war, Israeli forces had seized control of all Jordanian territory 
west of the Jordan River. It also had captured the Golan Heights. 
Israel continued to hold Arab territory it had occupied in 1967. This 
occupation was the cause of the next war between Arabs and Israelis. 
Israel's semmingly inflexible determination to hang on to Arab 
territory occupied in 1967 weakened the country's position in 
the international community and finally led to the fourth Arab-
Israeli war of 1973.16 
Yorn Kippur War (1973) 
On October 6, 1973, in a surprise move, Egyptian and Syrian troops 
crossed into Israeli-occupied territory in the Sinai Peninsula and the 
Golan Heights (Figure 3). This day was Yorn Kippur, the holiest day of 
the Jewish calendar. Initially, the invading forces succeeded in their 
strikes into Israeli-occupied territory. Later, Israeli forces sµcceeded 
! 
in breaking through the Egyptian lines to the west bank of the Suez Canal 
I 
i 
l61bid, p.45. 
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Figure 3. (Title) 
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and advancing to within 20 miles of the Syrian capital of Damascus. 
The United States and the Soviet Union then joined to seek a cease-
fire through the auspices of the United Nations. Israel and Egypt on 
November 11 signed a six-point cease-fire agreement worked out by United 
States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. The agreement was signed 
at a United Nations tent on the Cairo-Suez road. The meeting resulted in 
an exchange of prisoners of war and the lifting of Israeli seige of the 
city of Suez and the Egyptian Third Army. The initial penetration by 
Arab forces into Israeli-occupied territory was proof to the Arab world 
that Israel was not invincible. The Arabs finally had destroyed the myth 
of Israeli invincibility and had succeeded in their primary objective of 
refocusing world attention on the Middle East.17 
The 1973 war led to the first Arab-Israeli Peace Conference. U.S. 
diplomacy played a key role in ending the war and arranging a peace con-
ference. In 1974, three military disengagement agreements were executed 
between Israel and Egypt with the aid of Kissinger. The same year, the 
Israelis made relatively modest withdrawals from the Sinai front in Egypt 
as well as the Golan area on the Syri~n border. After a prrilonged period 
of difficult negotiations, the important agreement known as Sinai II was 
signed in September 1975 by Egyptian and Israeli representatives. C. 
Paul .Bradley of the University of Michigan at Flint wrote: 
The key provision of Sinai II was Israeli withdrawal from the 
strategically important Gidi and Mitla Passes. The Aba Rudeis 
oil fields were restored to Egyptian control. Egypt agreed to 
a three-year period of non-belligerency with Israe1.l8 
17 Ibid. , p. 46. 
18c. Paul Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process (Tompson & Rutler, 
Grantham, New Hampshire, 1981), p. 4. 
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The Sinai II agreement was welcomed by the Syrians, Jordanians and 
Palestinians. The next important attempt in bringing a resolution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was the Camp David accords signed in September 
1978. It was after the Camp David accords that some hope seemed to 
appear for Palestinian rights. President Jimmy Carter wrote abouit his 
thoughts in his memoirs. 
The continued deprivation of Palestinian rights was contrary to 
the basic moral and ethical principles of both of our (Israel 
and the United States) countries. In my opinion, it was impera-
tive that the U.S. work to obtain for these people the right to 
vote, to assemble and to debate issues that affected their 
1 i ves, to own property without fear of it being confi seated 
and to be free of military rule. To deny these rights was in-
defensible for a free democratic society.19 
The diplomatic agreements made at Camp David were the results of 13 
days of intensive negotiations between September 5-17, 1978. Two accords 
were reached at Camp David. 
The first provided a framework for dealing with the question of the 
West Bank and Gaza. Egypt and Israel would make overal 1 arrangements for 
a five-year transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza. After a 
self-governing authority had been. freely elected by the local inhabit-
ants, the Israeli military government and civilian administration would 
be withdrawn. The second of the Camp David accords set forth a framework 
for concluding an Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty.20 
After the accords, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty was signed in 
March 1979. The accords and the subsequent treaty each provided for a 
I 
self-governing authority freely elected by the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza. Egypt, Israel and Jordan were to agree on electoral 
I 
19 11 Keeping Faith, 11 Time, October 11, 1982, p. 35. 
20Bradley, pp. 31-32. 
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modalities for the self-governing authority, referred to as an adminis-
trative council. However, in the Palestinian autonomy talks that follow-
ed the treaty in May 1979, negotiations did not take place as set forth 
in the accords and treaty. The parties involved had their own view of 
autonomy. 
In Prime Minister Begin's formulation, Palestinian autonomy was 
to be not political, but administrative with only narrowly 
circumscribed functions being assigned to the proposed elective 
council. · Autonomy was to be applied only to 11 i nhabitants II and 
not to the land itself, a proviso designed to protect Israeli 
settlements. The Egyptians perceived autonomy in broader 
terms, envisioning a quasi-Parlimen~ary system that would lead 
logically to Palestinian statehood. 1 
The talks continued until October 1980 with no definite results. 
The last round of autonomy talks during the Carter Administration took 
place in Washington in October as the U.S. Presidential campaign entered 
its last weeks. As the brief sessions ended it was announced that the 
two sides would give further study to an American draft proposal. Fol-
lowing President Carter's defeat in the November elections, the once pro-
jected post-electoral summit of Carter, Begin and Sadat was cancelled. 
Carter's electoral defeat ended an important phase in a multi-
national effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. 11 When Jimmy Carter 
assumed the Presidency in 1977, he had assigned high priority to seeking 
a breakthrough in the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict. 11 22 The Camp 
! 
David accords had been one of the greatest achievements in Carter's 
presidency and as Bradley remarked, 11 In a drab Presidency, his per-
formance at Camp David stands out. 11 23 1 
21Ibid, p. 48. 
22Ibid, p. 6. 
23Ibid, p. 45. 
Carter wrote in his memoirs about his efforts to achieve a Middle 
East peace during his presidency: 
Looking back on the four years of my presidency, I realize that 
I spent more of my time working for possible solutions to the 
riddle of Middle East peace than on any other international 
problem ••• only history will reveal if my hopes and prayers 
are to be answered, or if another round of bloody confronta-
tions will ultimately lead to an international tragedy.24. 
History revealed what Carter had feared did happen, a round of 
bloody confrontations that led to an international tragedy -- the: PLO-
Israeli conflict and the massacre of Palestinian refugees in Beirut in 
22 
1982. Before examining the conflict and the massacre, a brief descrip-
tion of the PLO and its activities is essential. 
The PLO was founded in 1964 at the first Palestinian Nationa~ Con-
1 gress and was endorsed by all the Arab states. At the head is the 
Palestine National Council. Parts of the framework are the PLO Central 
Committee, the Palestine Liberation Army, the Palestine National Planning 
Board and the Palestine Research Center. PLO has offices in all the Arab 
states, in the U.S., China, Yugoslavia and Switzerland. Vasser Arafat is 
the chairman of the PLO, a position he has had since 1970. 
In 1982, there were more than 4 million Palestinians around the 
world. The majority are scattered throughout the Middle East, refugees 
from the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967. Pal~stinians around the 
world are either refugees or are engaged in banking and business, civil 
service, oil field work, unskilled labor and various professions. 
Palestinians have built lives throughout the Middle East -- las 
bankers, businessmen and farmers in Jordan, as bureaucrats and 
oil technicians in the Persian Gulf region. More than 100,000 
Palestinians live in the United States where some have 
24"Keeping Faith," p. 60. 
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succeeded as teachers, doctors and lawyers.25 
The number of Palestinians throughout the world is reported in F1gure 4. 
The PLO-Israeli Conflict, 1982 
"Death is always astonishing; nevertheless, in war, it is 
inevitable. 11 6 And so it was for the Israelis and Palestinians. The 
PLO-Israeli conflict began June 6, when the Israeli army invaded Lebanon 
in an attempt to crush strongholds of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. During the first seven weeks of the war, more than 300 
Israeli soldiers were killed. On the Lebanese and PLO side, the 
I 
casualties were high. In one attack alone, on August 5, 1982, the 
Palestine death toll was more than 125. 
For more than 10 hours the Israelis blasted Palestinian posi-
tions in the southern area of the city (Beirut) as well as the 
once fashionable Harma Street neighborhood to the North. The 
complete death toll was impossible to es~~mate, but Lebanese 
officials said at least 128 people died. 
The casualties were not confined to PLO soldiers. The Isra~li army 
was attempting to attack PLO positions in and around Beirut. In the pro-
cess, several hundred civilians were killed. "Only one in about 80 peo-
ple is a Palestinian guerrilla," Lebanese authorities said in August 
1982.28 For every weapon or bomb that was aimed at PLO soldiers, several 
civilians in Beirut were killed, injured or forced to take shelter. 
25 11 Where Do They Go From Here, 11 Newsweek, August 16, 1982, pl. 16. 
26Jacobo Timerman, The Lon est War: Israel In Lebanon (Vinta1ge Books, 
A Division of Random House, New York, 1982 , p. 7. 
27 11 The End Game in Beirut, 11 Newsweek, August 23, 1982, p. 16. 
281bid., p. 17. 
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PLO Israeli State Dept. 
Country Estimate Estimate Est1imate 
Lebanon 600,000 347,000 400,000 
Israel 531,000 653,000* 500,000 
West Bank (Israeli-occupied) 818,000 725 ,000 700,000 
Gaza Strip (Israeli-occupied) 477 ,000 450,000 450,000 
Jordan 1,161,000 1,000,000 
Syria 216,000 250,000 
Egypt 49,000 ~0,000 
Saudi Arabi a 127,000 
Iraq 20,000 12:0 ,000 
Kuwait 279,000 320,000 
Oman 48,000 500 
United Arab Emirates 35,000 40,000 
United States 102,000 
Other 1362000 4252000 
Total 4,559,000 4,265,500 
The above are estimates of the number of Palestinians throughout the 
world. (Sources: Israeli government estimates, Newsweek magazine August 
16, 1982, published August 8; State Department Palestinian Statiitical 
Abstract, PLO estimates, New York Times August 12, 1982.) 
*Including Golan Heights 
Figure 4. Palestinian Population of Various Countries 
25 
Often during the attacks in the 1982 conflict, the 500,000 reside1nts of 
West Beirut were affected by the Israeli efforts to drive out the: 6,000 
PLO soldiers among them. The scene in one attack, one Wednesday ii n 
August, is described by a Time magazine correspondent: 
The Israelis claimed that they were making every effort to 
avoid civilian casualties. Nevertheless, the Wednesday assault 
was seemingly designed to intimidate the civilian population'. 
Shells fell everywhere. People fled by the thousands to base-
ment shelters. A few were bombed out twice in one day, first 
from their own homes and then from the homes of friends.29 
What made the Israelies invade Lebanon? Even before June 6, the invasion 
date, an Israeli military push into Lebanon long had been threatered. 
But the shooting of the Israeli ambassador in London on June 3 wa~ the 
immediate cause of the invasion. 
Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain, was 
critically wounded in a shooting attack late June 3, as he w~s 
leaving a party in London. The attack, although disclaimed ~Y 
the Palestine Liberation Organization, wa~ cited by Israel as a 
factor in the decision to invade Lebanon. 0 , 
Beirut was besieged by Israeli forces in mid-June. U.S. special 
envoy to the Middle East, Philip Habib, began his talks with PLO and 
Israeli officials to negotiat~ a cease-fire in Lebanon soon after\the 
I 
' 
invasion. 
The first big break in the talks came in early July when, on 
his own initiative, Habib urged President Reagan to offer U.S. 
troops to help monitor a PLO withdrawal. Reagan agreed, a I 
gesture that reassured all sides that the United States was 
committed to a settlement.31 
The final break in talks did not come until August, when the ijnited 
29 11 Bei rut Goes Up in Flames, 11 Time, August 16, 1982, p. 16. 
30Facts on File, Volume 42, No. 2169, June 11, 1982 (Facts o~ File 
Inc., 1982, New York), p. 413. 
31 11 Habib The Peacemaker," Newsweek, August 30, 1982, p. 36. 
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States negotiated the evacuation of PLO soldiers from Beirut after 
prolonged talks with PLO soldiers and Israeli leaders. A total of 8,882 
PLO fighters were evacuated to the following destinations: 
About 4,000 to Syria, 265 to Jordan, 132 to Iraq, 1,000 to 
Tunisi~, 620 to South Yemen, 600 to North Yamen, 490 to the 
Sudan and 175 injured guerillas to Cyprus and Greece. Most 
left by ship, but about 1,500 traveled to Syria via the Beirut-
Damascus Highway.32 
On August 21, 1982, the first group of PLO trops left Beirut under 
an agreement calling for the withdrawal of more than 12,000 Palestinians 
and Syrians in Lebanon with the supervision of American, French a~d Ital-
ian troops. The withdrawal was completed by September 1. The Beirut 
massacre occurred during the troop withdrawal. Bashir Gemayel, a leader 
of a right-wing Maronite Christian force, was elected president August 
23. Gemayel was killed September 14, when a bomb exploded in a building 
where he was meeting with followers. The same day, Israel's Prime Min-
i ster Menachem Begin ordered the Israeli Army into West Beirut "to pre-
vent the reorganization of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 11 33 
Tragedy struck two days later. 
In a rampage beginning late September 16, Christian militiamsn 
stormed through two Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut, 
machine-gunning hundreds of men, women and children to death~34 
As the gruesome cleanup continued, most estimates of the number 
dead w§re around 1,000 altho~gh the exact number would never be 
known. 5. 
Reports fi 1 ed by newsmen, foreign observers and Western di pl qmats 
32 11 The U.S. Marines Go Ashore," Newsweek, September 6, 1982, p. 30. 
33 11 Crisis in Lebanon," The New York Times, September 21, 1982, p. 10. 
34Facts On File, Volume 42, No. 2184, September 24, 1982, p. b97. 
35 11 A Time of Reckoning," Newsweek, October 4, 1982, p. 4. 
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mentioned that two groups carried out the killings in the refugee
1 
camps 
of Sabra and Shatila. 
One was the Christian Phalangist militia belonging to Bashir 
Gemayel, the President-elect who had been slain September 14 in 
a bomb blast. The other was the army of Major Saad Haddad, 
which had been trained and funded by Israel and which was 
closely allied with the Israeli military command.36 
Bashir Gemayel 1 s assasination may have been the prime cause of the 
massacre. It took place at the headquarters of Gemayel 1 s Christian 
Phalange Party in East Beirut around 4 a.m., Lebanese time, September 14. 
I 
Gemayel was killed when a bomb estimated to weigh at least 200 pounds 
exploded in the headquarters. This was how Time magazine describ~d the 
scene: 
In the street outside, a Christian Phalangist member of the ' 
Lebanese parliament raised his hand to his mouth and cried, "Ya 
A 11 ah! (my God!) That I s the Kata I eb ! " He was referring to 
the headquarters of Gemayel 1 s Christian Phalange party. The 
explosion had smashed cars and scattered parts of bodies 
through the streets.37 
Who killed Gemayel? There was no shortage of suspects, according to 
Time magazine. 
He was hated by the leftist Muslim militias and by the Syriarns. 
The PLO had been his enemy for years. There was also a theory 
advanced by Arab 1 eaders in Lebanon that Israel was behind the 
bombing because Gemayel was resisting pressure from the Begin 
government to sign a peace treaty.38 
While it is not clear who killed Gemayel, it is clear that t~e 
killing in the refugee camps were done by rightwing Lebanese Chri~tian 
militiamen. 
11 P ract i cal ly everybody agreed that gunmen were ri ghtwi ng Leb~nese 
36Facts on File, Volume 42, p. 697. 
37 11 The New Lebanon Crisis, 11 Time, September 17, 1982, p. 22. I 
38Ibid., p. 25. 
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Christian militiamen, 11 39 wrote a Time magazine correspondent. The 
militiamen were either from the Lebanese forces led by the vengeance-bent 
Gemayel clan or from the militia run by Major Saad Haddad, which :is based 
in Southern Lebanon and is allied closely with the Israelis. The Time 
I 
magazine writer called the Lebanese forces more logical culprits than 
Haddad's army, "since they live in the region and were mourning for their 
fallen leader (Bashir Gemayel). 11 40 
What about the Israeli role in the massacre? The two camps were 
under their control and they had checkpoints near the camps. Although 
the Israeli government condemned the massacre as soon as details became 
known, reports in the news media indicate that Israeli army officers were 
aware of the killings and did little to prevent them. Here are pOrtions 
of news reports in The Christian Science Monitor which establish the 
Israeli role in the massacre: 
The Israeli government knew on Thursday night of the massacre 
in progress at Shatila refugee camp but did nothing about it 
until Saturday morning, according to authoritative reij~rts by 
Israeli journalists in the Hebrew press September 20. 
Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon has admitted that the 
Israeli Army helped plan and coordinate the foray of Lebanese 
Christian militiamen into two Palestinian refugee camps that 
resulted in a massacre.42 
It is suggested that foresight on the part of the Israeli army 
officials in control of the two refugee camps could have prevented the 
39Ibid., p. 20. 
40Ibid., p. 20. 
41 11 Beirut massacres touch off debate over Israeli role, 11 The 
Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1982, p. 9. ~! 
42 11 Israel in uproar as details of massacre emerge, 11 The Chri~tian 
Science Monitor, September 23, 1982, p. 1 I 
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massacre. The Israeli officials stated that they had sent the Christian 
militiamen into the refugee camps to search for weapons and enemy gunmen. 
The Lebanese leader Bashir Gemayel had been killed only two days before 
and they could have expected that sending the Christian militiamen into 
Palestine refugee camps might result in harm to the refugees. A Newsweek 
writer wrote: 
Although many questions remained unanswered about the massacre 
in West Beirut, it was clear that Begin's government and Army 
would have to bear a considerable share of the blame for the 
death of perhaps 1,000 Palestinians. Despite their stated goal 
of preventing bloodshed, the Israelis had actually sent the 
Christian militiamen into Beiruts Sabra and Shatila refugee 
camps to search for weapons and enemy gunmen. Israel had good 
reason to expect that atrocities might occur. Israel learned 
about the murder of civilians not long after it began. Israel 
stood by for a day or more before it finally intervened and 
stopped the killing.43 
The Massacre Probe and the Resignation of Sharon 
After the massacre, there were daily disclosures about what the 
Israelis knew of the happenings inside the two refugee camps at the time 
of the massacre. To a great extent, the credibility of the Israeli army, 
known as Israeli Defense Forces, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin's 
government was damaged by the massacre. 
An Israeli high commission of inquiry was set up in December by 
Begin to investigate the massacre and to find the parties responsible. 
After a two-month investigation and weeks of deliberation, the commission 
issued its report February 8, 1983. The commission's report was a com-
plete analysis of the circumstances of the Beirut massacre. It heard 
testimony from, among others, Begin, Sharon and several other 
43 11A Time of Reckoning, 11 p. 20. 
high-ranking officials. 
The commission dismissed allegations of direct Israeli 
responsibility in the killings. However, varying measures of indirect 
responsibility. were placed on several officials. 
The Panel criticized Defense Minister Sharon for various 
11 Blunders 11 tantamounting to a 11 nonfulfil lment of a duty 11 and 
recommended his resi~nation or dismissal •••• The Panel accepted 
Prime Minister Begins contention that he had not learned of 
the operation until it was under way but said his 11 indiffer-
ence11 had allowed other officials to neglect 11 appropriate mea-
sure" to halt the killings.44 
In more detail, some of the commission 1 s findings and 
recommendations were as follows: 
Direct Responsibility -The actual killings had been carried out 
by the Phalngist militia alone, the commission found. The Panel 
rejected allegations that troops of Major Saad Haddad, the 
Israeli-backed militia commander in southern Lebanon, had been 
involved in the operation. The commission said such allega-
tions had been based on coincidence and misinterpreted evi-
dence. 
Indirect Responsibility - The commission nevertheless found in-
direct responsibility, through ignorance or commission, to be 
widespread among high Israeli officials. The commission con-
cluded firmly that there had been every reason to expect 
Phalangist reprisals against the Palestinians, given their 
life-long enmity and the assassination of the Phalangists 1 
leader, President-elect Bashir Gemayel, just two days before 
the operation in the camps. The Panel rejected the contention 
of numerous government officials that excess bloodshed could 
not have been foreseen.45 
After two days of difficult debate, the Israeli cabinet voted 
30 
February 10, 1983, to adopt the report of the Commission of Inquiry. The 
resignation of Sharon was announced the next day, February 11. Sharon 
remained in the Cabinet as minister without portfolio. on February 23, 
44Facts on File, Vol. 43, No. 2204, Feb. 11, 1983 (Facts on File 
Inc., New York, 1983), p. 81. 
45Ibid. 
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Morshed Arens, Israeli ambassador to the United States, was confirmed as 
defense minister. 
Studies Related to the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Karen Ann Feste of the University of Denver wrote in a 1977 lstudy 
about the Arab-Israeli conflict: 
I 
Studying Arab-Israeli relations provides an intriguing, fasc,in-
ating introduction to international politics. Historical ci!r-
cumstances, policy commitment through time, entangling · 
complexity in the issues that mark the conflict picture, all 
combine into currently held positions and emotionally charge~ 
views often expressed by interested parties. It is quite ap-
propriate, therefore, to select a politically provocative, 
delicate issue for analysis.46 
· Through the years, writers and researchers have studied several 
politically provocative, delicate issues pertaining to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Feste, in her study, reviewed the historical backgrounij of the 
conflict and examined the issues and constraints confronting the nations 
involved in the conflict. Writers before and after her have publjshed 
i 
studies on various issues of the conflict, including the Arab-Jew~sh wars 
and their aftermath since the creation of the state of Israel, th~ 
personalities and intentions of the Palestinian Arab movement, the Third 
World's and Eastern Europe's view of Israel and case studies of 
individual Palestinians and their life histories. Studies also h~ve been 
published on the role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
: 
suggestions for a lasting solution to the conflict, and views of ~iddle 
East experts, and the relation between the Arabic press and natio~alism 
in Palestine, and American news coverage of the conflict. Some at these 
46Karen Ann Feste, 
(The American Political 
p. 1. 
I The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Decision makin Game 
Science Association, Washington, D.C., 19!7 , 
! 
studies are similar to this writer's study. 
A review of some studies follows: 
Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs by Roger Fisher 
The most important task in the Middle East is to make it a 
better place tomorrow than it is today. The greatest need 
to figure out some things that people should do to improve 
situation, and to make it more likely that they will do 
them.47 
is 
tihe 
i 
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Fisher, in his study, presents a 11 refreshing 11 viewpoint about solu-
tions to the Arab-Israeli conflict, one reason why his study is cited 
first. 
Fisher, while a consultant member of a group exploring the prospects 
for peace in the Middle East in 1971, wrote letters to Israeli, 
Palestinian, Jordanian, American and United Nations officials. Trese 
letters were incorporated in his 1972 study suggesting solutions for 
peace. Fisher contends that a better question to ask while seeking an 
answer for peace would be what ought to happen rather than debating which 
party is right or wrong. 
Everyone concerned with the Middle East necessarily makes an 
implicit or explicit judgment about the most useful questions 
to which he should devote his time and effort. Those who argue 
about historical facts, from one point of view or another, are 
making the common assertion that such debate is a wise and 
effective use of their time and talents. To engage in such 
debate is to diddle while Rome burns. It is to argue over 
navigational mistakes of the past while the ship goes on the 
rocks.48 
Fisher states the Middle East is not one problem but the culfuination 
of many. Many Arabs and many Israelis like to think of the situation 
47Roger Fisher, Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs (Harper & Row Pub~ishers, 
New York, 1972), p. 12. 
48Ibid. 
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as a simple strugg.le between two sides, between good and evil. A single 
solution cannot be reached, but a comprehensive settlement could be 
negotiated with a "package deal," according to Fisher. He suggested a 
I 
package deal with 27 points, each of which dealt with specific issues in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. His suggestions were published in 1972. 
Points specifically dealing with the Palestinian problem are: 
An agreement between Jordan and representatives of the 
Palestinian people accepting the sovereignty of Jordan over the 
West Bank and assuring their rights within Jordan. 
An agreement between Israel and Jordan governing the boundaries 
of Gaza and establishing and governing the arrangements for 
·freedom of access between Gaza and the West Bank. 
i An agreement between Jordan and Palestinian representatives in 
Gaza establishing and governing the relationship between Gaza 
and Jordan. ' 
An agreement between Israel and Lebanon confirming their 
boundary and releasing claims with respect to all other 
matters outstanding between them. 
Israeli legislation defining the rights of Palestinians who 
lived in 1948 in what has become Israel and who left in 1948 or 
thereafter, with respect to returning or not returning to 
Israel and with respect to compensation; legislation 
establishing procedures for processing claims. 
An agreement between Israel and the leaders of Palestinian 
organizations accepting the state and boundaries of Israel and 
financial and immigration measures undertaken by Israel and 
renouncing all further claims against Israel beyond those 
provided in the new arrangements.49 
Decision-Making Game 
The American Political Association organized in the Summer ot 1975 
I 
the College Faculty Workshop in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Participants1 were 
political scientists and faculty members from universities around ~he 
49Ibid., p. 16. 
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country. Middle East Game, as it was called, was formulated in the 
workshop. The game focuses on how decision-makers put together and use 
information they acquire. 
The Middle East Game is an operating model of the political aspects 
surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute. The game consists of a sim~lified 
representation of a group of nations that includes Israel, severa~ Arab 
I 
states and the great powers. In addition, the United Nations, the rest 
of the world (ROW) and the press are constituted as game components. 
Primary activity of the game concerns the enactment of policies of 
the respective parties, and national teams may engage in a variety of 
i 
political actions such as forming coalitions, waging war or negotiating 
I 
peaceful settlements on specific problems like their counterparts! do in 
the real international community, in an attempt to achieve the objectives 
specified by the governmental policy leaders. 
The intent of the game is to help the role players 11 acquire a richer 
sense of the complex and often confusing picture facing governmental 
leaders and understand how some psychological factors may guide or 
determine po 1 icy choices. 11 50 
The game requires a minimum of 18 players and a director. The 
teams, and respective number of players, in this arrangement are: 
Israel-2, Egypt-2, Jordan-2, Syria-2, Palestinians-2, United States-2, 
Soviet Union-2, United Nations-I and Press-2. 
To play the game well, game participants should be aware of the 
background of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the military capabilities 
I 
of nations involved. Game participants are evaluated on their sehse of 
50Feste, pp. 6-7. 
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knowledge and sense of realism and on their ingenuity in manipulating the 
international or domestic environment. 
In concluding Feste wrote: 
Participants in numerous test runs of the Middle East Game have 
responded quite favorably to the experience. Some important 
factors emerged for predicting success, including game set-up, 
playing time and evaluation components.51 
American Policy for Peace in the Middle East, 
1967 - 1971 
This study, sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, was conducted by Roger J. Pranger, a resident 
scholar of the institute. The study examined three topics: 
First, the major decisions in American Middle East policy from early 
1969 to late 1971. 
Second, the field of forces in the Middle East in 1971, which was 
partly an outgrowth of decisions and events between 1968 and 1970; an 
assessment of the prospects for peace. And finally, in the light of the 
assessment for peace, proposal of recommendations for further Ame~ican 
policy initiatives.52 
Pranger, in describing the purpose and approach of the study, 
wrote: 
This is not an analysis of so-called 11 casualties 11 in the Middle 
East, of which the author is quite aware, but of peacemaking 
efforts by the United States in the region, or better put, this 
51Ibid., p. 4. I 
52Robert J. Pranger, American Policy for Peace in the Middle East ( Amer i can Ent e rp r i s e Inst i_t_u_t e-f,,_o_r_P_u.,...b.,,..11.,....· c.__P_o._,,.l..,.i-cy_R_e_s_e_a_r_c_h_, _W_a_s_h_i_n ..... g_t _on-, 
1971), p. 4. 
(study) addresses the issue of how a policy of peace can be 
developed in the midst of contrary realities.53 
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The Pranger study reviews critical decisions by the United States in 
Middle East policy between 1969-1971. He recommends that the United 
States continue its peace initiatives in a policy of balanced principle 
and manoeuver. He wrote: 
Renewed fighting between the Arab States and Israel could only 
work adversely on American interests in the Middle East, 
especially if the United States were drawn into the conflict 
directly on Israel 1 s behalf so that American forces engaged 
Arab and Soviet forces. One can only imagine the impact of 
such intervention on American fortunes in the Arab world for 
the next decades, to say nothing of the combined effect that 
U.S. - USSR hostilities would have on world peace.54 
In his recommendations, Pranger indicated the importance of using 
negotiations in resolving the Middle East conflict rather than measures 
of force, such as war. 
When nations perceive their interests to lie in the direction 
of peace, as the United States does in the Middle East, then 
the total resources of the state, including military force, may 
become devoted to preventing war. For such a perception to 
develop, a special fascination with persuasion rather than 
force must be present.55 
This writer believes that Pranger 1 s recommendation in 1971 r~garding 
negotiation is evident in 1983. Today, the United States is pursuing a 
I 
policy of peace through negotiation rather than peace through force in 
its attempts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
53Ibid., p. 4. 
54Ibid., p. 57. 
55Ibid., 
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Arabs, Israelis and U.S. Television Networks: 
Content Analysis of How ABC, CBS and NBC 
Reported the News Between 1970-1979 
This study was conducted at Ohio University in 1981 by Moad Osman 
I 
Asi, a doctoral student. Asi 1 s basic contention was that only a small 
percentage of the American people are sympathetic toward the Arab 
nations, especially when that percentage is compared to that sympathetic 
to Israel. He stated that research has indicated the U.S. print media 
and mass entertainment convey rather negative coverage or messages about 
the Arabs, Arabism or Islam. By contrast, the messages conveyed about 
Israel and Israelis are more favorable. 
According to Asi, American mass media carried images and stereotypes 
of the Arabs without serious and dispassionate attempts to verify these 
"facts" from close range.56 
Asi first collected hard data regarding television news about the 
Arab states and Israel between 1970-1979. Data included date, network, 
story time 1 ength and news category. Second, he selected a strat!if_i ed 
random sample for directional coding purposes. Videotapes of the stories 
were obtained from Vanderbilt University's Television News Archives. The 
coding was done by five graduate students from the College of Communi ca-
tion at Ohio University. These students were born in the United States. 
A 5-point scale was developed with "very favorable," and "very unfavor-
able," at its extremes. Sources for all data collected for this study 
were Television News Index and Abstract, and Television News Arch~ves, 
both of Vanderbilt Uni ve rs i ty. 
56oissertation Abstracts International, Vol. 42, No. 02, August 1981, 
p. 436 A. 
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Asi attempted to explain how the three U.S. television networks cov-
ered the Arab states and Israel during 1970s. The methodology employed 
in the study was content analysis, focusing on the presentational dimen-
sions of the weekday evening network news. 
Results indicated ABC, CBS and NBC were similar in their coverage of 
the Arab states and Israel. Israel received more attention and was por-
trayed more favorably than the Arab states. Among the Arab states, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabi a and Syria accounted for 90 p;ercent 
of the Arab world's coverage on the three television networks. E1gypt and 
Lebanon accounted for more than two-thirds of news coverage from the Arab 
states. 
Asi also found a significant increase in news covc~r'd0r~ ,:1f!y,· .~.!1:_:: 
".:',lb-Israeli 1973 war. The directional coding indicated Israel ernerged 
as the good side and the Palestine Liberation Organization as the bad 
side. Egypt was the most favored Arab state among the three networks. 
Stories about Israel tended to be more balanced than stories about the 
Arab world.57 
An Exploratory Analysis of National Perceptions 
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict as Represented 
Through World Newspapers: An International 
Communication Study 
Alan Jay Zareba of the State University of New York at Buffalo 
conducted this study in 1977. 
I 
The purpose of his research was to investigate national perceptions 
57rbid. 
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regarding the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, as communicated through major 
newspapers. Additionally, this study sought to examine the effect that 
Arab economic actions taken after the 1973 outbreak had on the percep-
tions of various nations. 
Content analysis methodology was utilized to assess newspapelr attit-
udes toward key Mid-East issu~_$... in the conflict. The issues of Terror-
·.....,,...,.- .. ,. 
ism, Aggression, Imperialism, Land Legitimacy, Action Justification, 
Intransigence, Peace Seeking, Zionism, and Culpability were examfned. 
Statements made vis-avis these issues, prior to the Arab economic 
actions, were juxtaposed with the statements made after these actions to 
assess an effect based on economics. 
According to Zaremba, the results of the study "revealed at least.J_ a 
·-------·-.. - ........_ __ U _____ ,_, .. ~···~-···~-· ,v<,,A ____ ....,.. ...--
dichotom in atti es among the newspaper:s..., 11 58 
·--
In discussing the 
I 
results, he wrote: 
The Straits Times, The New York imes, and The London Times, 
perceived the Arabs as the ag _as.sor, The Moscow News and the 
Daily Graphic perceived the Isr.&.eJis as the aggressor. The 
Asahi Evening News was noncommittal regarding the aggressor in 
conflict. The comparison of the statements before and after 
the economic actions revealed that economic actions did not 
r~f~~; ~~~ff;~::g~es of the newspapers regarding crucial issues 
In his recommendations, Zaremba said that the data base for such 
research sould be expanded. He wrote that "it is precarious at best to 
-..-...... ~-..----·~"""'u,~·•-"'-"'"""- - "1:.;._,.._,,. .. ,.,.,_,, .. ,.'"'"--·•--
generalize on the basi..?. of six neW?.P.§_P.efs, despite the valuable dpta 
•<YM•M• .. •~,u~---,~----- .._,_,,_~_,_.,.,'>,.>M'"",._ ,-....... i 
58Ibid. 
59Alan Zaremba, An Exploratory Analysis of National Perceptions of 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict as Re resented throu h World News a ers: 
An International Communication Study State University of N.Y. at 
Buffalo, 1977), p. 289. I 
that the examination of these newspapers yielded 11 .60 
Zaremba suggested the following categories under which futur,e 
research could be based, consistent with the need to extend the data 
base: 
An examination of different newspapers utilizing the sam~ 
criteria. 
An analysis of official government statements from the 
countries in which the six examined newspapers are published. 
/ ~~~ r~~~?I;_~~1l~~~~a~~~~g~r:~.~~-¥~f~~i tbJn _ _a_ 
An examination of the communist bloc nations to assess the 
degree of consistency within the bloc. 
40 
An examination of The New York Times perception with.an Isra.el.L r 
.JLe.wspaper-: An examination of the Moscow News perceptions with 
those of an Arab newspaper. 
An examination and comparison of the same six newspapers after 
each of the four major wars in the conflict.61 
60rbid., p. 289-291. 
61rbid. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
American sympathies are now about equally divided between 
Israel and the Arab nations -- the first time ever that Isr~el 
has not been heavily· favored. A Newsweek Poll conducted l asit 
week shows that large majorities of Jews and non~Jews believed 
that Israel is at least partly to blame for the massacre in, 
West Beirut .1 
The Beirut massacre, an incident that began in Beirut's Pal~stine 
refugee camps on the evening of September 16 and ended the morni~g of 
I 
September 18, 1982, cost more than 1,000 lives. Immediately after the 
massacre, much of the blame appeared to fall on the Israelis as ~he camps 
were under Israeli control. Criticism against Israel erupted in ~estern 
Europe, across the United States and was widespread in the media around 
the world. In France, Britain, West Germany and Italy, press critidsm 
of Isreal was severe, extending even to traditionally pro-Israeli pub-
lications. 
London's Daily Telegraph, the staunchest supporter of Israel 
among the leading British newspapers asserted flatly that "tre 
massacre took place as a result of Israel's policies." The· 
conservative West German daily Die Welt said in an editorial 
Wednesday "unintentional as it may be, Israel's entanglement, in 
this atrocious crime has cast a deep shadow on the reputatioh 
of the Jewish nation.2 
What was the reaction to the massacre of national newspapers in the 
l 11A Time of Reckoning," Newsweek, October 4, 1982, p. 23. 
2 A. D. Home, "Europeans Protest Massacre But Fear an Increate in 
Anti-Semitism, 11 The Washington Post, September 25, 1982, p. A. 18~ 
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United States? Did their news content reflect a change in attitude 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict following the massacre? 
In an attempt to answer these questions, this study examines, the 
reporting of the Arab-Israeli conflict in two leading U.S. newspapers, 
The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The New York Times 
is published each morning seven days a week. On week days, the circula-
tion is 861,000 and on Sundays 1,421,000.3 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
is published in the evenings seven days a week. It has a circulation of 
255,340 on week days and a Sunday circulation of 433,116.4 
The study used content analysis to examine the news reports of the 
Arab-Isaeli conflict published in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-
Dispatch between June 6, 1982, the date of the Israeli advance into 
Lebanon, and February 11, 1983, the date of Israeli Defense Minister 
Ariel Sharon's resignation. 
I 
Budd, Thorp and Donohew describe content analysis as follows: 
Content analysis is a systematic technique for analyzing mes~ 
sage content and message handling - it is a tool for observing 
and analyzing the overt communication behavior of selected com-
municators.5 
Content analysis has been used to determine the relative emphasis or 
frequency of various communication phenomena: propaganda, trends, 
styles, changes in content, readability. It is a method of observ!ation 
and measurement. According to Budd, Thorp and Donohew, "Content analysis 
3workin Press of the Nation 1981 Media Enc clo edia (Nationa~ 
Research Bureau Inc., 1981 , p. I-247. 
4rbid., p. 1-210. 
5Richard Budd, Robert Thorp and Lewis Donohew, Content Analys~s of 
Communications (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967), p. 2. 
allows the investigator to observe a communicator's public messages at 
times and places of the investigator's own choosing. 
The procedure also allows the investigator to complete his 
observation without bias, something that would be more 
difficult if the analyst were trying to watch at the scene. 116 
Kerlinger states that content analysis is more than a method of 
analysis. It is a method of observation. He wrote: 
Instead of observing people's behavior directly, or asking them 
to respond to scales, or interviewing them, the investigato~ 
takes the communications that people have produced and asks 
questions of the communications.7 
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This study involved symbol analysis. Forty key symbols pertaining 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict were chosen for the study. }he symbols are 
!lords which stand for the attitudes of the user. Accardi ng to P~ol: 
! 
The symbol analyst works with words by selecting those which 
best stand for the attitudes whose presence or absence he 
wishes to detect and describe. Symbols, thus conceived, se~ve 
as his 11 operational indices 11 of attitude.8 
Using symbols, the investigator attempted to determine the two 
news-papers• coverage of the Arabs and Israelis before, during and after 
the massacre. Expressions of attitude 11 are usually categorized as 
favorable, unfavorable, or neutral. 119 
While recording data, the symbols+ (plus), - (minus), and O (zero) 
were assigned to the three categories -- favorable, unfavorable and 
7Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (Holt 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., Chicago 1964), p. 525. 
' 
I 
8Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Presti e Pre~s: A Com arative Stud of 
Political Symbols (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 22. I 
9Harold D. Lasswell, 11The Comparative Study of Symbols, 11 Hoover 
Institute Studies (Stanford, California, 1952), P. 10. I 
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neutral, respectively. 
Each of the categories favorable and unfavorable were furthe~ clas-
sified into the sub-categories of "strength" and "morality," depending 
upon which of these standards were indicated in the favorable or unfavor-
ab le assertion. 
Strength refers to the position of the symbol as a cause of value 
changes. It includes military, diplomatic, economical, and ideological 
assets and effectiveness. The morality standard relates to confo~mity or 
non-conformity of a symbol to a norm. It includes the presentation of 
symbols in terms of beauty, goodness, consistency and the like.10 
What kinds of references are favorable or unfavorable? This is gen-
erally a matter of definition, according to Budd, Thorp and Donohew. 
They state that "it is the responsibility of the analyst to formulate 
complete and logical definitions of favorable and unfavorable 
materials.11 
Operational Definition of V_ariables 
1. Arabs: References to the.Arab states and their leaders, the 
people of Arab states, the Palestine Liberation Organization, itslmembers 
and representatives, Vasser Arafat, Palestinians and Palestinian 
refugees. 
2. Israelis: References to the people of Israel, the Isra~li 
I 
government, Israeli army and Israeli media; 
lOibid., p. 12. 
llBudd, Thorp and Donohew, p. 63. 
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3. Favorable: References to the parties in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in a positive light. These references will be in relation to 
the two sub-categories, strength and morality. 
4. Unfavorable: References to the parties in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in a negative light. This also will be in relation to the two 
sub-categories, strength and morality. 
Research Questions 
The following research questions were asked: 
1. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict r~ Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis? 
/ 2. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
/ ~e Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis? 
\
1 3. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis? 
--4. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
before the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs? 
5. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
during the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs? 
6. Was The New York Times' coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs? 
- I 7. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict before the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis? 
I 
8. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli 
I 
conflict during the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israelis? 
9. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-I~raeli 
conflict after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Israe~is? 
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10. Was The St. Louis Post Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict before the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs? 
11. Was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict during the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs? 
12. Was The St. Louis Post-Disptach's coverage of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict after the Beirut massacre favorable/unfavorable to Arabs? 
I 
Taking the conflict from June 1982 to February 1983 as a whole, I 13. 
, was The New York Times' coverage more favorable to the Israelis than 
Arabs? 
14. Taking the conflict from June 1982 to February 1983 as? whole, 
I 
\was The St. Louis Post-Dispatch's coverage more favorable to the Israelis 
\han Arabs? 
Key Symbols 
Pool states that the "choice of words (symbols) and techniques 
depends on what one wishes to find out."12 Symbols frequently repeated 
in the literature were noted and the following forty were selected for 
analysis: 
1. Menachem Begin 
2. Vasser Arafat 
3. Israel 
4. Palestine Liberation Organization 
5. Israeli Soldiers 
6. Ari el Sharon 
7. Major Saad Haddad 
12pool., p. 23. 
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8. Bashir Gemayel 
9. Amin Gemayel 
10. Lebanon 
11. Palestinians 
12. Sabra and Shatila 
13. Jews 
14. Moslems 
15. Israeli Advance into Lebanon 
16. PLO Fighters 
17. Israeli Armed Forces 
18. Israeli Public 
19. Israeli Media 
20. Beirut Seige 
21. King Hussein 
22. Yitzhak Shamir 
23. Syria 
24. Egypt 
25. Jordan 
26. Iraq 
27. Israeli Knesset 
28. Christian Phalangists 
29. Hosni Mubarak 
30. Palestinian Question 
31. Morocco 
32. Saudi Arabia 
33. West Bank and Gaza 
34. Massacre Probe 
35. Begin Administration 
36. Arab League 
37. Anti-Semitism 
38. PLO Pullout 
39. Palestinian refugees 
40. Israeli Bombardment of West Beirut 
Coding Procedures 
The smallest segment of content counted and scored in content 
analysis is the coding unit. The most common coding units are 
a word; a theme or assertion; a paragraph; an itemj a character 
group, object, or institution; and space or time.1 
48 
The basic unit of measurement involved in content analysis is the 
coding unit. In this study, the coding unit was a word, or symbol. 
While coding, the following rules were observed: 
A city was coded as the country it is located in, unless the city 
was represented as a symbol by itself. For example, Tel Aviv or 
Jerusalem was coded as Israel, since they were not among the list of 
symbols. Any public figure, such as a'minister or national leader, was 
coded as his or her country unless he or she was in the symbol code. 
References to supporters of Israel were coded under Israel. An example 
I 
, I 
would be Lebanon's Christian Phalangist Party which was supported '.by the 
Israelis. 
The following rules were followed for classifying strength and 
morality: 
1. Strength Plus: Gain of, act, indication, promise, hope i 
13Ibid. 
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expectation, demands of: economic, military, diplomatic, social strength 
and/or gain. Diplomatic strength: envoy recall, demands for reparations, 
verbal attacks and offensives, belligerent stands, pro-war and anti-peace 
stands, threats. 
2. Weakness Minus: Loss of, act, indication, expectancy of 
weakness or defeat in the military, economic, diplomatic, or social 
spheres. Economic weakness: lack of items constituting economic \ 
strengths described above; need for aid, shortages. Diplomatic weakness: 
yielding to pressure, conciliatory attitudes, pro-peace, anti-war in face 
of threats. 
3. Morality Plus: Emotional evaluations of the symbol, endowing it 
with the following qualities: truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue, 
propriety, religiosity, honor, generosity, kindness, affection, sympathy, 
duty, justice, honesty, patriotism, loyalty, legality. 
4. Immorality Minus: Emotional evaluation of the symbol, endowing 
it with the following: falsity, viciousness, ferocity, uncharitableness, 
cowardice, impropriety, paganism, dishonor, selfishness, cruelty, hatred, 
vanity, treachery, treason, subversiveness, unjust, dishonest, unpatriot-
ism, disloyalty, illegality, aggressions, insanities, abnormalities. 
Samples of coding sheets that were used while content ·analyzing each 
article are enclosed in the appendix. 
i 
The articles in The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
were read for symbols listed earlier in the chapter. When a symb'?l was 
found, it was then coded, its predication was determined and classified. 
If the classification of the predication was+ according to stren~th, the 
symbol was coded in the +S column under the symbol; if the predic~tion 
was -s according to the strength, code number of the symbol was written 
I 
in the -S column under the symbol; and so on. 
The coded sheets were then tabulated and the frequencies of each 
symbol in the code sheet was tabulated by a simple counting operation. 
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Three-way frequency analyses were completed, juxtaposing: 1) Parties 
of the Conflict, 2) The Two Newspapers and 3) Predication or Direction of 
Symbol Usage in News Columns. 
A percentile table was prepared for The New York Times and the St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch. The percentile table for each newspaper shows 
the following during each phase of the conflict: 
a) Negative presentation of the Arabs and the Israelis. 
b) Positive presentation of the Arabs and the Israelis. 
Pilot Study 
When the analyst has drawn up a set of preliminary rules for 
classifying direction, his next step is to conduct a pilot 
study on the material to be analyzed. 
The pilot study will also indicate whether the prescribed 
coding and recording system are functioning properly and may 
suggest changes or alterations in the initial plan.14 
A pilot study was conducted to ensure only necessary symbols were 
jncluded in the g,nalysis and to ensure coder reliability. An arti'cle 
from each newspaper was chosen and given to two coders who were as!ked to 
'I ' ! 
content analyze the articles according to procedure described earlier. 
The investigator also content analyzed the same article and the ex!tent of 
agreement among the three coders was compared to establish the 
~liability of the coding system, _to indicate the reliability of the 
measuring devices, and to identify the necessary symbols. 
14Ibid., p. 52. 
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It must be noted that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on 
for more than a century. In recent times, the conflict has becom~ more 
intense than ever, and as the conflict has intensified political ~nalysts 
I 
and historians have presented their views. 
It will not be the concern of this study to state or determirile 
which side is right and which side is wrong. The study will restrict its 
scope and findings to the news coverage by The New York Times and St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch. 
To date, the Beirut massacre ranks among the most significant events 
in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. How two of America's leading 
'1 
national newspapers covered the conflict before, dur.i ng and after the 
massacre should provide insight into the impact of major internatfo_!!_g.l 
events on news content. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
"Even now I don't understand about the Sects -- The Phalangists, 
the Moslems and everybody fighting," said Captain Dan Heller of 
Tel Aviv. "Why can't they get together and make one Lebanon? 11 l 
Captain Dan Heller, who was quoted in The New York Times, may have 
expressed the feelings of so many civilians and soldiers involved in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict when he wondered why the parties involved could not 
get together and unify Lebanon. Although very few understood the reasons 
for the conflict, they played their part, and the conflict has continued 
just as it has since 1948 when the Republic of Israel was formed. As the 
conflict continued, so did the coverage of its major events in American 
newspapers. 
This study was concerned with reporting of the conflict between 
June 6, 1982, and February 12, 1983. The study was conducted on the 
basis of articles published in The New York Times and the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch during the specified time period. A total of 175 stories 
were read in The New York Times and 187 stories were read in the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch. It must be noted that only news articles were 
content analyzed by this writer; editorials were not part of thislstudy. 
The stories were read for presence of !orty key 2ymbol~ mentioned 
I 
earlier. A 11 plus 11 presentation of a symbol put it in a favorable light; 
1 Dav i d K • S h i pl e r , 11 Gen i al W ar f o r I s r a el i s Ne a r B e i rut , 11 T he New 
York Times, June 20, 1982, p. 1. 
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a "minus" presentation put it in an unfavorable light. 
Following are a few examples of how symbols were coded during 
analysis. 
All night Thursday and into Friday morning Palestinians from 
the Sabra and S~i.)_a_Jamps flocked to the Gaza Hospital hoping 
to f~na protection from the Christian militiamen combing the 
camps.2 
In content analyzing the above sentence, we code thus: Sabra and 
Shatila ~~lity ~; Christian militiamen~orality mi~us. 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin bowed to relentless political 
pressure within his governing coalition today and agreed to 
establish a full-fledged judicial commission to investigate the 
Beirut Massacre.3 
Menachem Begin strength minus. 
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The Israeli government said today that its military objectives had 
been achieved.4 
Strength plus for the symbol of Israel. 
On Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon visited his troops 
in Christian East Beirut·5 
Neutral for Ariel Sharon. 
This study was concerned with three phases of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict occurring between June 6, 1982 and February 12, 1983. The first 
211 Militiamen Violent Act Becoming Clearer," The New York Tililles, 
Sept. 27, 1982, p. A6. 
i 
3"Begin Agrees to Establish a Panel to Investigate the Beirut 
Massacre," The New York Times, Sept. 30, 1982, p. 1. 
411 Israeli-Syrian Cease-Fire Excludes PLO," St. Louis Post-Disptach, 
June 11, 1982, p. 1. 
5"only Few Hours Left, Israeli Loud Speakers Warn Civilians," St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, July 3, 1982. p. 2A. 
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phase dealt with events before the Beirut massacre, the second phase dur-
ing the massacre and the third phase with events after the massacre until 
the resignation of Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in Febru~ry. 
The classification of phases enabled the writer to detect changes in at-
titudes, if any, in news coverage by The New York Times and the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch. 
Table I shows the direction and dimension of symbols during each 
phase of the conflict in The New York Times and Table II shows the same 
for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The figures in the two tables express, 
in terms of percentages, the neutral symbols, symbols for positive and 
negative strength, and positive and negative morality. To take an 
example, in Table I, the Figure 18.2 in Phase I represents the sum of 
percentages under Arabs for positive strength and positive morality from 
a total of 1773 symbols, and 24.5 is the sum of percentages for negative 
strength and negative morality; 9.2 is the percentage figure under Arabs 
for neutral symbols. Tables I and II have each been broken down into 
three tables for clearer discourse. These tables are numbered III 
through VIII. This writer will now review figures in tables I and II 
with respect to each phase of the conflict. 
Phase I, June 5 - September 17, 1982 
Israel invaded Lebanon June 4, 1982, and began a series of attacks 
on PLO positions in that country. The military side of the confli1ct was 
emphasized in the coverage of both newspapers. 
Percentages of symbols reported in The New York Times during Phase I 
are shown separately in Table III. Percentages for the St. Louis IPost-
1 
Dispatch for the same phase are shown in Table IV. 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL SYMBOLS USED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES DURING THREE PHASES 
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: CODED BY DIRECTION AND DIMENSION 
Arabs Israelis 
+ 0 - + 0 
Phase s M s M s M s 
18.2 9.2 24.5 29.47 6.7 12.1 
I 9.6 8.6 15.7 8.8 20.9 8.57 6.5 
40.2 8.3 2.8 4.2 15.27 29.2 
II 1.4 38.08 0.0 2.8 2.8 1.4 1.4 
15.7 5.8 5.3 17.4 10.7 44.8 
II I 4.1 11.63 4.1 1.2 8.7 8.7 9.9 
S+ = Positive Strength M+ = Positive Morality 
0 = Neutral M- = Negative Morality 
S- ~_Negati!e Strength N = 2486 Symbol Frequencies 
M 
5.6 
27.8 
34.9 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
u, 
u, 
TABLE II 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SYMBOLS USED BY ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH DURING THREE PHASES 
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: CODED BY DIRECTION AND DIMENSION 
Arabs Israelis 
+ 0 - + 0 
Phase s M s M s M s 
8.5 35.96 13.38 15.9 19.5 6.7 
I 4.3 4.2 9.26 4.12 13.7 2.8 2.8 
20.2 23.6 2.2 19.00 19 .10 15.73 
II a.a 20.2 2.2 a.a 8.98 10.1 1.12 
9.38 16.38 3.38 12 .11 32.40 26.35 
II I 1.84 7.54 2.19 1.19 4.75 7.36 5.16 
S+ = Positive Strength M+ = Positive Morality 
0 = Neutral M- = Negative Morality 
s- = Negative Strength N = 5827 Symbol Frequencies 
M 
4.9 
14.61 
21.19 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
(J1 
O'I 
+ 
Phase s 
I 9.6 
Total 18.2 
TABLE III 
DIRECTION AND DIMESION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES 
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE I 
Arabs Israelis 
0 + 0 
M s M s M s 
8.6 15.7 8.8 20.9 8.57 6.5 
9.1 24.5 29.47 6.7 
M 
5.6 
12.1 
Total 
100 
u, 
-...J 
+ 
Phase s 
I 4.3 
Total 8.5 
TABLE IV 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH ON 
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE I 
Arabs Israelis 
0 + 0 
M s M s M s 
4.2 9.16 4.1 13.2 2.8 1.8 
35.96 13.38 16.0 19.5 
M 
4.9 
6.7 
Total 
100 
CJ1 
co 
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In Phase I, The New York Times• percentage for positive strength for 
Israel was 20.9, while the positive strength under Arabs was only 9.6. 
The St. Louis Post-Oispatch 1 s portrayal of Israeli strength was even more 
clearcut, with 4.3 percent for Arabs, and 13.2 percent for Israelis. 
Paragraphs such as the following, reporting Israeli military gains 
and emphasizing Arab military weakness frequently were found in the two 
newspapers. The New York Times correspondent Thomas L. Friedman wrote on 
the second day of the Israeli invasion: 
Israeli fighter bombers and artillery attacked Palestinian 
guerrillas in caves, underground bunkers and hillside gun posts 
around Nabatiye, Arnun, Wadi Al-Akhdar, Jarmaq and the Beaufort 
Crusader Castle, al 1 about 10 miles north of the borders, ' 
according to United Nations spokesmen. It has been widely nbted 
here that the Syrian Air Force has made no effort to engage the 
Israelis, who killed two Syrian soldiers in the air raid on 
February.6 
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, in a news article published June 8, 
1982, stated, in part: 
Inland, the Israelis on Monday captured ancient Beaufort 
Castle, the clifftop fortress from which the Palestinians hact 
shelled the Galilee Panhandle. The Israelis also overran thb 
eastern mountain town of Hasbaya, capital of Aikoub province, 
nine miles north of the Panhandle, and Nabatiye, a forward PLO 
command post 10 miles from the Israeli border. Israel's 
announced goal is to push the Palestinians back at least 25 
miles from the border so that their artillery and rockets could 
no longer hit northern Israel.7 
The high percentages for Israelis 1 positive strength in both 
newspapers during Phase I may have been partly due to restriction~ 
imposed by Israel on news correspondents in reporting military conflicts. 
I 
I 
6Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel Pressing Attacks on PLO; 2 Sides Fire 
Across Lebanese Line," The New York Times, June 6, 1982, p. 1. 
7"PLO Head Pleads For Soviet, Arab Aid," The St. Louis Post-
Oispatch, June 8, 1982, p. 4. 
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This writer noted that some of the news articles in Phase I in The New 
York Times carried a statement in italics under the headline saying, 11The 
following dispatch has been subjected to military censorship." The St. 
Louis Post-Disptach did not carry such statements, but one can assume 
that its dispatches also were subjected to censorship since all foreign 
correspondents are subject to the same regulations. 
This writer noted that the two newspapers dealt more with strength 
presentations for Arabs and Israelis than with morality presentations of 
symbols in Phase I. During this phase, there was not much difference 
between morality presentation of symbols in either side by both 
newspapers. 
As shown later, the tables turned and morality became a major issue 
during and after the Beirut massacre in September. 
Phase II, September 18-19, 1982 
The lead paragraph in the September 19, 1982, issue of The New York 
Times summed up the first day of the Beirut massacre in one concise 
' 
' 
sentence, expressing all that happened in Sabra and Shatila. The lead 
read: 
Beirut, Lebanon, September 18 -- Lebanese Christian militiamen 
massacred scores of Palestinian men, women and children in a 
refugee camp on the southern edge of west Beirut Fri day ni t't, 
according to witnesses and reporters who visited the camp. 
The lead in the St. Louis Post-Disptach describing the events on 
Saturday, September 18, 1982, was grim: 
811 Massacre Toll is at least 300, 11 The New York Times, Septe~ber 19, 
1982, p. 1. 
Beirut, Lebanon -- The bodies of hundreds of men, women and 
children, many of them apparently shot in the head or back were 
found inside two Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut 
Saturday.9 
An increased number of mortality symbols was noted in this Phase, 
which dealt with details of the massacre. Symbol percentages for the 
Phase are shown in Tables V and VI. 
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In Phase II, The New York Times had 27 .8 percent morality mi'nus for 
the Israelis and ony 2.8 percent morality minus for the Arabs. Morality 
plus, on the other hand, was high for the Arabs and almost nil for the 
Israelis. The New York Times had 38.08 percent morality plus for Arabs 
and 1.4 percent morality plus for the Israelis. As described in an 
earlier chapter, one of the emotional values that constitutes morality 
p 1 us is sympathy. Sympathy for Arabs in the refugee camps was expressed 
to a great extent in both newspapers. 
Bodies lay piled in groups of 10 or more scattered through the 
ruins of the two refugee camps, which until recently housed 
tens of thousands of civilians. Bulldozers had been used to 
pile wreckage on many of the bodies in an attempt to conceal 
them, but arms and legs were sticking out of the rubble.10 . 
Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times correspondent, wrote: 
Walking down the rubble-strewn streets of Shatila this morning, 
reporters found two old men shot through the head, several 
piles of women and children, their bodies covered with flies, 
and at least one line of middle-age men who had been lined up 
against a cinder-blocked wall and executed.11 
Reports in both newspapers attempted to present a picture of the 
death and destruction in the two refugee camps and also recreate for the 
911 Hundreds Slain in Beirut refugee camps, 11 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
September 19, 1982, p. 1. 
10 11 Hundreds Slain in Beirut refugee camps, 11 p. 8. 
ll 11 Massacre Toll is at least 300, 11 p. 1 
+ 
Phase s 
II 1.4 
Total 40.2 
TABLE V 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THE 
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE II 
Arabs Israelis 
0 + 0 
M s M s M s 
38.08 o.o 2.8 2.8 1.4 1.4 
8.3 2.8 4.2 15.27 
M 
27.8 
29.9 
Total 
100 
0) 
N 
+ 
Phase s 
II o.o 
Total 20.2 
TABLE VI 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH ON 
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE II 
Arabs Israelis 
0 + 0 
M s M s M s 
20.2 2.2 a.a 8.98 10.1 1.12 
23.6 2.2 19.00 19.10 15.73 
M 
14.61 
Total 
100 
CJ) 
w 
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reader the acts committed by Christian Phalangists. It was during such 
presentations that the symbol 11 Christian Phalangists 11 was endowed the 
emotional qualities of viciousness, ferocity, cruelty and hatred, which 
are described in an earlier chapter. 
The New York Times correspondent Friedman wrote: 
The Christian militiamen stormed the Palestinian Akka Hospital, 
from which the International Committee of the Red Cross was 
trying to remove some of the wounded patients. Reliable 
Western medical sources who were at the hospital said a 
Palestinian nurse was repeatedly raped and shot dead by 
Christian militiamen. A Red Cross spokesman later said, 
"Injured peoQle were killed in their hospital beds, others were 
kidnapped. 11 12 
The portrayal of Christian Phalangists by the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch was not as severe as The New York Times. The St. Louis Post-
Dispatch did quote refugee camp residents as saying many refugees had 
been 11 kil led by Lebanese Christian militiamen, 11 13 in the second paragraph 
of its September 19, 1982, story on the massacre, but later qualified its 
report in the same story by stating the following: 
Some camp residents said the victims had been gunned down by 
the right-wing Phalangist militia. Others said the gunmen were 
from the forces of Saad Haddad, a renegade Lebanese army major 
who allied himself with Israe1.14 
Also, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch avoided any hint of an Israeli 
role in the massacre. A quote in the September 19, 1982, story seemed to 
clear Israel of any wrongdoing in the massacre. 
'If any forces entered the camps it was not to our knowledge' 
said an Israeli military source in Beirut. 'The IDF (Israeli 
Defense Forces) have blocked entrance to the camps of Shatilia 
12 11 Massacre Toll at least 300, 11 p. 14 
13 11 Hundreds Slain in Beirut refugee camps, 11 p. 1 
14Ibid. 
and Sabra to all other forces until we are able to hand over 
the area to the authorities of the Lebanese army•.15 
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Therefore, because the St. Louis Post-Dispatch's treatment of the 
Israeli side was not severe, the Israelis did not receive as many 
morality minus symbols as they did in The New York Times. The Israelis 
received only 14.61 percent morality minus symbols in the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch for Phase II but they received 27 .8 percent in The New York 
Times. Percentages for Arabs in both newspapers under morality and 
strength minus were almost negligible, less than 3 percent. Neither 
newspaper portrayed Arabs as weak or immoral, at a time when hundreds of 
unarmed Arab refugees were being killed in their homes. 
Phase III September 20, 1982 -- February 12, 1983 
The word to describe events after the massacre is "soul-searching." 
After the massacre, everybody was asking questions, wondering why or how 
such a human tragedy took place. This soul-searching attitude was 
reflected in the American media which reported evidence each day 
indicating that the massacre could have been prevented by the Begin 
administration. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, quoting Israeli newspapers, 
said: 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government knew for,1,t 1 east 36 
hours that Lebanese Christian Phalangists were killin~ 
Palestinians in refugee camps in West Beirut, but took no 
action to stop the slaughter.16 
It appears the media became aware of what was happening in Beirut 
16"Begin Did not Stop Killings, Press Says," St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, September 10, 1982, p. 2. 
only after the Beirut massacre. Until then, the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was one more conflict to cover and all the media needed was the most 
daring and competent reporters in strife-torn Lebanon. After the 
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massacre, the question of right and wrong was the main issue. Somehow 
Israel seemed no longer the champion of democracy in the Middle East. 
The New York Times correspondent David K. Shipler reflected this view 
when he wrote: 
After the events of last week, Israel may never again be able 
to feel the same way about itself. Something snapped. The 
belief, the convinction that Israel was somehow different, 
somehow special amid the brutality and hypocrisy of the world's 
nations, was profoundly shaken if not swept away.17 
Tables VII and VIII show symbol percentages in The New York Times 
and St. Louis Post-Dispatch respectively for Phase III. 
The New York Times came down hard on Israel in the third phase. So 
much so, that Israel received the highest percentage of mortality minus, 
with 34.9 percent in Phase III, compared to 17.8 percent in Phase II and 
5.6 percent in Phase I. The reader can see how the morality minus 
evaluation for the Israelis in The New York Times, endowing them with the 
qualities of falsity, viciousness, cruelty and aggression, among other 
things, increased steadily from Phase I onwards. The same increase in 
morality minus for Israelis in th.e St. Louis Post-Dispatch can be 
observed, but to a lesser degree. The Israelis received a morality minus 
evaluation of 21.19 percent in Phase III, 14.67 in Phase II and 4.9 in 
Phase I. Also, in the third phase, statements made by the St. Louis 
Post-Disptach reporters about Israel were not as severe as in The New 
17 11 Massacre Brings on a Crisis of Faith For Israelis, 11 The New York 
Times, September 16, 1982, IV, p. 1. 
+ 
Phase s 
III 4.1 
Total 15.7 
M 
TABLE VII 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES 
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE III 
Arabs Israelis 
0 + 0 
s M s M s 
11.63 4.1 1.2 8.7 8.7 9.9 
5.8 5.3 17.4 10.7 
M 
34.9 
44.8 
Total 
100 
O') 
...... 
+ 
Phase s 
I I I 1.84 
Total 9.38 
· TABLE VIII 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT DURING PHASE III 
Arabs Israelis 
0 + 0 
M s M s M s 
7.54 2.19 1.19 4.75 7.36 5.16 
16.38 3.38 12 .11 32.40 
M 
21.19 
26.35 
Total 
100 
O'> 
00 
York Times. The St. Louis Post-Disptach appeared conservative in its 
coverage in the third phase, with its correspondents refraining from 
passing judgment (in news articles) about Israeli actions. This 
conservative approach was noted especially during the days immediately 
after the massacre. For example, Bob Admas, a St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
correspondent, wrote in an article on September 16, 1982: 
For the first time, Israelis -- with the memories of the 
Holocaust and anti-Jewish programs still vivid -- must face the 
possibility that they share a responsibility for a slaughter of 
the innocents.18. 
As noted earlier, morality, not strength, was the main issue in 
Phase III in both newspapers. A look at Table I shows that in The New 
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York Times, the figures for Arab strength plus and minus were 4.1 percent 
in each case and for Israelis it was 8.7 and 9.9 percent respectively. 
In Table II, in the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the percentages for strength 
plus and minus under Arabs were 1.84 and 2.19 respectively; for Israelis 
4.75 and 5.16 percent respectively. 
In Phase III, the morality issue, rather than the immorality issue, 
gained increasing importance as time passed. Noteworthy is that Phase 
III began with the period immediately after the massacre and ended with 
the resignation of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. During this period, 
there were frequent disclosures of Israeli role in the massacre, reports 
of the massacre probe, and finally, reports on the massacre inquiry 
commission's findings, which resulted in the defense minister's 
resignation. 
18 11 Israel in Turmoil After Massacre," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
September 16, 1982, p. 1. 
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Symbol Direction in Each Phase 
More than 8,000 symbols relating to the conflict were published in 
The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch between June 1982 and 
February 1983. Of these, around 3,500 were neutral symbols. 
Three-way frequency analyses were completed juxtaposing: 1) Parties 
to the conflict; 2) The two newspapers and 3) Prediction or direction of 
symbol usage in news columns. 
Analyses were completed on news stories appearing before, during and 
after the Beirut Massacre. Additionally the author analyzed symbol 
frequencies observed across all phases of the conflict. 
These four analyses addressed ·all the research questions posed 6n 
page 46, though not in the same ord~r. 
Phase I 
Before the Beirut Massacre, the newspapers printed nearly 6,000 
symbols relevant to parties of the conflict -- the far greater number 
(4,038) appearing in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, with 1,776 in The New 
York Times. 
Heaviest used symbols were int.he neutral context (2,521), followed 
by those in the favorable (1,834) and unfavorable contexts (1,459). 
Unfavorable symbols about Arabs exceeded the favorable in both 
newspapers. Noteworthy, however, is the large number of neutral symbols 
used by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch -- far more than the number of 
favorable and unfavorable symbols combined. In The New York Times, 
neutral symbols regarding Arabs figured lowest in pre-Massacre coverage. 
Favorable symbols about Israel, on the other hand, more than doubled 
those in the unfavorable context (1,168) favorable v. 485 unfavorable). 
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Again, the St. Louis Post-Disptach stores were laden most heavily with 
neutral symbols, while the New York Times printed a significantly lesser 
number of symbols in neutral than other contexts. 
If one compares alternating columns in Table IX, disparity in use of 
symbols about parties to the conflict become even more vivid. 
For example, columns 1 and 3 show the New York Times publishing 
significantly more favorable than unfavorable symbols about Israel and 
more unfavorable than favorable symbols about Arabs. Columns 2 and 4 
show the same trend in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
In summary, pre-Massacre news was more favorable to Israel than to 
the Arabs in both papers. However, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch news was 
more to the middle-of-the-road, in that the majority of its symbols lay 
in the neutral context. Neutral symbols in the New York Times comprised 
a distinct minority. 
Phase II 
The shorter period during the Beirut Massacre involved the use of 
only 161 relevant symbols, as shown in Table X. The majority portrayed 
favorable or neurtral contexts. 
Both papers carried more symbols in the favorable than unfavorable 
contexts regarding the Arabs (74 v. 4). Conversely, the New York Times 
carried more unfavorable than favorable Israeli-relevant. symbols. The 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, still heaviest in use of neutral symbols, 
over-all, carried only an insignificantly-larger number of favorably-set 
symbols about Israelis. 
Viewed another way, from alternating columns in Table X, the New 
York Times carried more favorable symbols on Arabs than on Israelis 
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TABLE IX 
SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED BEFORE THE BEIRUT MASSACRE 
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH: 
BY DIRECTION AND PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 
Arabs Israelis 
St. Louis St. Louis 
Symbol New York Post- New York Post-
Direction Times Dis~atch Times Dis~atch Totals 
Favorable 323a 343a 522f 646; 18341 
Unfavorable 434b 54oc 2159 170j 1459m 
Neutral 163d 1452e ugh 737k 2521n 
Totals 920° 2335P 856q 1703r 5814 
x2 = 121.05, df=2, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Arabs) 
x2 = 310.60, df=3, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Israelis). 
x2 = 899.55, df=2, p.<.001, Post-Dis~atch, symbol direction (Arabs). 
x2 = 251.64, df=2, p.<.001, Post-DisQatch, symbol direction (Israel). 
Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies. 
Symbol 
TABLE X 
SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED DURING THE BEIRUT MASSACRE 
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH: 
BY DIRECTION AND PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 
Arabs Israelis 
St. Louis St. Louis 
New York Post- New York Post-
73 
Direction Times Dis~atch Times Dis~atch Totals 
Favorable 29a 18a 3d 17e 67f 
Unfavorable 2b 2b 21e 14e 399 
Neutral 6d 21e 22e 17e 55h 
Totals 37i 42i 35i 43i 161 
x2 = 34.55, df=2, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Arabs) 
x2 = 13.99, df=3, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Israelis). 
x2 = 15.26, df=2, p.<.001, Post-Dis~atch, symbol direction (Arabs). 
x2 = .37, df=2, p.> .05, Post-Dis~atch, symbol direction (Israel). 
Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies. 
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(29 v. 3), while the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was "equally" favorable to 
the sides (18 v. 17). Both papers, however, printed more unfavorable 
symbols about the Israelis than about Arabs. 
Summing up Massacre;..period news, both papers carried more favorable 
than unfavorable news about Arabs. And Arabs, more so than Israelis, 
were portrayed favorably in the New York Times stories, but not in the 
St. Louis Post~Disptach articles. Also, the New York Times, unlike the 
St. Louis Post-Disptach, carried more unfavorable than favorable news 
about Israelis. News in both papers howed Israelis in a less favorable 
light than Arabs. 
Phase II I 
News in the aftermath of the Beirut Massacre followed the trend of 
the symbol direction observed during the Massacre, in some cases, but not 
all. 
Israelis continued to make the news in a more unfavorable context 
than did the Arabs. And the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, unlike the New York 
Times, continued its heavy use of symbols set in a neutral context, as 
shown in Table XI. 
Adjacent columns in Table XI show both papers carried more favorable 
than unfavorable symbols regarding Arabs, while the symbol context 
regarding Israelis was heavily unfavorable, relative to that for Arabs. 
Alternating columns, however, show that the New York Times carried 
news as favorable to Israelis as to Arabs (114 v. 103, p > .05), with the 
St. Louis Post-Disptach comprising more of the favorably-set symbols 
about Israelis than Arabs. But looking at unfavorable symbols, seven to 
eight times as many applied to Isarel as to Arabs. 
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TABLE XI 
SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED AFTER THE BEIRUT MASSACRE 
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH: 
BY DIRECTION AND PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 
Arabs Israelis 
St. Louis St. Louis 
Symbol New York Post- New York Post-
Direction Times Dispatch Times Dispatch Totals 
Favorable 103a 158a 114e 204a 579k 
Unfavorable 35b 57b 293f 444i 8291 
Neu~ral 38b 276d 709 546j 93om 
Totals 176n 491° 477° 1194P 2338 
x2 = 50.34, df=2, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Ardbs) 
x2 = 175.49~ df=3, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Is~aelis). 
x2 = 146.88, df=2, I p.<.001, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (Ara9s). 
x2 = 105.67, df=2, p. < .001, Post-Dispatch, symbol direction (IsrJe1 ). 
! 
Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies. 
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Essence of the post-Massacre period was that news in both papers 
comprised more symbols in context unfavorable to Israelis than to Arabs. 
At the same time, symbols in favorable contexts applied as much to 
Israelis as to Arabs in the New York Times, and significantly more so in 
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
All Phases 
Tables IX through XI show a shift in direction of symbol use toward 
Arabs and Israelis. It would appear the shift was concomitant with the 
events. Before the Massacre, there were more favorable than unfavorable 
symbols about Israel, while unfavorable symbols were dominant in news 
about Arabs. 
During the Massacre, both papers carried a greater number of 
positive symbols about Arabs, while more negatively - than positively -
set symbols were attributed to Israelis by the New York Times. St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch news during the Massacre was "equally'' positive and 
negative regarding direction of symbols relevant to Israel. 
Following the Massacre, both newspapers' symbol usage clearly fell 
more and more into a positive context regarding Arabs and in the' negative 
context regarding Israelis. 
In Table XII, symbol frequencies spanning the entire period of study 
portray, to a great extent, the directional order shown before the 
Massacre (Table IX), with few exceptions. 
For example, throughout the period, the New York Times• stories 
comprised a lesser number of favorable symbols toward Arabs than did the 
St. Louis Post-Disptach (455 v. 519). I This was due to the relatively 
lesser number of Arab-favorable symbols published by the New York Times 
I 
Symbol 
Direction 
Favorable 
Unf avorab 1 e 
Neutral 
Totals 
x2 = 116.02, 
x2 = 228.84, 
x2 = 991.21, 
x2 = 217.14, 
TABLE XII 
SYMBOL FREQUENCIES PUBLISHED DURING ALL PHASES 
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AND ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH: BY DIRECTION AND 
PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 
Arabs Israelis 
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St. Louis St. Louis 
New York Post- New York Post-
Times Diseatch Times Diseatch Totals 
455a 519c 639f 867i 24801 
471a 599d 5299 723j 2327m 
207b 1749e 20oh 135ok 3506n 
1133° 2867P 1368q 2945r 8313 
df=2, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Arabs) 
df=3, p.<.001, New York Times, symbol direction (Israelis). 
df=2, p.<.001, Post-Diseatch, symbol direction (Arabs). 
df=2, p.<.001, Post-Diseatch, symbol direction (Israel). 
Note: Differing superscripts denote significantly different frequencies. 
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after the Massacre, as shown in Table XI (103 v. 158). Before the 
Massacre, however, the difference in number of favorable symbols attached 
to Arabs by the New York Times and by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was 
insignificant (323 v. 343). 
At the same time, however, the New York Times' stories, over the 
whole period, carried about as many favorable as unfavorable symfuols 
regarding Arabs, whereas before the Massacre, symbol use fell heavily 
toward Arab-unfavorable. Accounting for this was the fact that the New 
York Times ran a few lesser ratio of unfavorable-to-favorable sy~bols 
about Arabs during and after the Massacre. The offsetting effect was 
that, over-all, the New York Times showed no significant differerice in 
use of favorable and unfavorable symbols toward Arabs. 
The Trends 
Table XIII is focused on the issues of favorable and unfavo~able 
directions for the two parties in The New York Times and Table XIV deals 
with the same in St. Louis Post Dispatch. In what light were the Arabs 
and Israelis portrayed by The New York Times and St. Louis Post-
Dispatch? 
In Table XIII, the figures for favorable were compiled from the 
' presentations of either side in positive light; and those for unfavorable 
from presentations in negative light. A look at Table XIII indicates a 
shift in direction in The New York Times' coverage of Arabs and Israelis 
during the Arabs-Israeli conflict, June 1982 to February 1983. This 
proposition is supported significantly in all three phases and by 
expected frequency tests showing strong contingency coefficients (c) of 
I 
magnitude of relations. 
Phases 
I 
II 
I I I 
TABLE XIII 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SYMBOLS DURING EACH OF THE THREE PHASES 
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES 
Arabs Israelis 
Favorable Unfavorab 1 e Favorable Unfavorab 1 e x2 df c 
18.2 24.5 29.4 12.1 6.7 1 .8776 
40.3 2.8 4.2 29.2 50.4 1 .981 
15.7 5.3 17.4 44.8 14.26 1 .936 
Level of 
Significance 
P < .05 
P < .001 
P < .001 
-....J 
'° 
Phases 
I 
II 
II I 
TABLE XIV 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SYMBOLS DURING EACH OF THE THREE PHASES OF THE 
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
Arabs Israelis 
Level of 
Favorable Unfavorable Favorable Unfavorable x2 df c Significance 
8.5 13.38 15.9 6.7 4.45 1 .8306 P < .05 
20.1 2.2 19.00 15.73 7.83 1 .8924 P < .01 
9.38 3.38 12 .11 26.35 6.98 1 .8812 P < .01 
co 
0 
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In Phase I of the conflict, figures for the Arabs are 18.2 percent 
favorable and 24.5 percent unfavorable and for Israelis 29.4 percent 
favorable and 12.1 percent unfavorable. With an observed chi-square of 
6.7, the difference is significant. The observed chi-square of 6.7 can 
occur by chance less than 5 times in 100 such experiments. The 
coefficient of contingency of 0.8776 shows a strong relationship. 
Evidence of the change in di rect ion in The New York Ti mes' cove rage 
can be seen in figures for Phase II and III shown in Table XIII. In 
Phase II, the figure for favorable is 40.3 percent for Arabs as opposed 
to 18.2 in Phase I for Arabs. A similar shift can be seen in unfavorable 
figures for Israelis .in The New York Times in Phase II. The Israelis 
received 29.2 unfavorable as opposed to 12.1 percent in Phase I, while 
the percentage for unfavorable increased, percentage for favorable for 
the Israelis dropped from 29.4 to 4.2 percent in The New York Times. The 
observed chi-square of 50.4 in this phase for The New York Times is 
significant. The observed chi-square of 50.4 can occur by chance less 
than five times in 100. The coefficient of contingency of 0.981 shows a 
strong relationship. 
We must remember that the Phase II period refers to the days of the 
massacre and coverage of massacre-related events. Sympathy for the Arabs 
was overflowing at this time and the Israelis, on the other hand, 
received harsh treatment from The New York Times' correspondents. 
Figures in Phase III for The New York Times shown in Table ~III also 
provide evidence of the change or shift in direction. The unfavorable 
figure for Israelis was 44.8 percent in Phase III compared with 29.2 
percent in Phase II. However, the favorable percentage for Israelis 
increased from 4.2 percent in Phase II to 17.4 percent in Phase II. 
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Overall, in this phase, the difference is significant, with an observed 
chi-square of 14.26. The observed chi-square of 14.26 can occur! by 
chance less than five times in 100. The coefficient of contingency of 
0.936 shows a strong relationship. 
Table XIV shows the favorable and unfavorable figures for Arabs and 
Israelis in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for the three phases. Here also, 
like in The New York Times, a shift in direction after Phase I can be 
seen. In Phase I, the Arabs received 8.5 percent favorable symbols and 
13.38 percent unfavorable symbols, and the Israelis received 15.9 percent 
favorable and 6.7 percent unfavorable symbols. With an observed. 
chi-square of 4.45, the difference is significant. The observed 
I 
chi-square of 4.45 can occur by chance less than five times in 100. The 
contingency coefficient of 0.8306 shows a strong relationship. 
In Phase II, when the massacre was going on, the Arabs received 
favorable coverage, an increase from 8.5 percent in Phase I to 20.2 
percent in Phase II, as shown in Table XIV. For the Israelis, the 
percentage of unfavorable symbols increased more than double, fr~ 6.7 in 
Phase I to 15.73 in Phase II. This indicates a shift in coverage, from 
favorable to unfavorable for Israelis and from unfavorable to fa~orable 
for Arabs. Apparently the massacre events brought about the shi~t in 
coverage. In this phase, the observed chi-square of 7.83 is significant 
and can occur by chance less .than five times in 100. The contingency of 
coefficient of 0.8924 shows a strong relationship. 
Emphasis on coverage of Arabs decreased in the St. Louis 
i 
Post-Dispatch during Phase III. The Arabs received only 12.76 percent of 
the favorable and unfavorable symbols in Phase III, which is loweir than 
the percentage in any other phase. In this phase, the shift in 
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direction, which was observed in Phase II, continues. A look at Table 
XIV shows that the Israelis received 15.73 percent unfavorable symbols in 
Phase II; the percentage increased to 26.35 in Phase III. The observed 
chi-square in this phase is 6.95 and the difference is significant. It 
can occur by chance less than five times in 100. The contingency of 
coefficient of 0.8812 shows a strong relationship. 
Individuals and Issues 
Tables XV and XVI show the presentation of selected individwals and 
issues by The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch respectively for 
I 
the three phases of the conflict. These were Prime Minister Beg1n, 
Defense Minister Sharon, PLO Chairman Arafat, Palestine Liberati@n Organ-
ization, Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and the Palestinian question. 
The presentations in Table XV and XVI refer only to positive and negative 
presentation in The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 1The 
i 
object of considering key individuals and issues is to find out how these 
were treated, whether in positive light or negative light. Also, the 
object is to find out how much emphasis was placed in covering these 
individuals and issues. 
Table XV indicates that Prime Minister Begin was highly favqred by 
i 
The New York Times with 125 positive symbols and 41 negative symbols over 
the three phases. Next ranks Sharon with 89 positive symbols. However, 
Sharon received 60 negative symbols too, almost all of which he ~eceived 
I 
in Phase III when his indirect role in the massacre became known~ 
The table indicates that Arafat did not receive as much covdrage as 
Begin or Sharon. Whatever coverage Arafat did receive was mostly pos-
1 
itive with 44 favorable symbols and 17 negative symbols. The Paliestine 
I 
Phases 
I 
II 
I II 
Total 
TABLE XV 
PRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUALS ANO ISSUES IN THE NEW YORK TIMES 
OVER THREE PHASES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
Begin Sharon Arafat PLO Sabra and Shatila 
+ - + 
-
+ 
-
+ - + -
106 8 71 37 14 93 223 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 30 0 
19 33 18 59 7 3 6 6 53 0 
125 41 89 60 44 17 99 231 83 0 
Palestinian 
Question 
--
+ 
4 0 
0 0 
0 0 
4 0 
a:> 
+'> 
Phases 
I 
I I 
III 
Total 
TABLE XVI 
PRESENTATION OF I~DIVIDUALS AND ISSUES IN THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 
OVER THREE PHASES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
Begin Sharon Arafat PLO Sabra and Shatila 
+ - + - + - + - + -
56 10 23 15 48 31 84 244 3 0 
0 0. 0 0 2 0 6 1 25 0 
47 44 25 89 6 1 8 16 105 0 
103 54 48 104 56 32 98 261 123 0 
Palestinian 
Question 
+ 
3 6 
0 0 
2 2 
5 8 
00 
u, 
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Liberation Organization was portrayed negatively with 231 negative sym-
bols and only 99 positive symbols. This is largely due to presentation 
of the PLO as a terrorist organization, especially in Phase I. 
As for the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, they did not enter 
the news until Phase II. The reader will note that this symbol did not 
receive a single negative presentation. No reporter was portraying 
refugees in the two camps in negative light after they had been 
slaughtered in their homes. 
The Palestine question, in this writer's opinion, is a major issue 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is the question focusing on the future 
of Palestinians and the question unanswered for all these years. This 
question was referred to as a symbol by The New York Times, only four 
times during the entire conflict, all four in Phase I. The New York 
Times was so busy covering battle scenes and killings that it failed to 
address the question of the Palestinian homeland, which is the underlying 
question of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Table XVI shows the presentation of selected individuals and issues 
in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch over the three phases of the conflict. 
Among individuals, Begin received the highest number of positive symbols, 
103; he received 54 negative symbols. Sharon appears to be the 
individual least favored by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, with 104 
negative symbols and only 48 positive symbols. The writer noted that 
there were no articles in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in which Sharon 
defended himself against negative coverage. Arafat received more positive 
coverage than Sharon, with 56 positive symbols and 32 negative symbols. 
As in The New York Times, the PLO was portrayed in a negative light 
by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Table XVI shows that the PLO received 
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261 negative symbols of which 244 were in Phase I. Here too, the PLO 
received negative coverage because of the impression during the first 
phase that it is a terrorist organization. Sympathy for Sabra and 
Shatila refugee camps was more evident in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
than in The New York Times. The camps received 123 positive symbols, 
60 in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch compared to 83 in The New York Times. 
The St. Louis Post-Disptach did not place much emphasis on the 
Palestinian question. Like The New York Times, the issue received almost 
no consideration. The symbol 11 Palestinian question 11 received 5 positive 
symbols and 2 negative symbols in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
This study 1 s findings indicate that symbols were presented in the 
context of news as reported in the New York Times and St. Louis Post-
Dispatch. The prediction of symbols seemed to parallel the occurrence of 
events before, during and after the Beirut Massacre. 
DJ:!._ring the massacre4 the New York Times and St. Louis Post-Disptach 
presented more favorable news symbols about Arabs. As for Israelis, more 
favorable symbols were found in the New York Times during this phase. 
The St. Louis Post-Disptach carried 11 equally positive and negative 
symbols relevant to Israelis 
In Phase III, the period after the Massacre, both newspapers carried 
stories with Arabs falling in a positive context and Israelis in ij 
negative context. 
As for presentation of individuals and issues, Prime Ministen Begin 
was was mentioned in favorable contexts by The New York Times over the 
three phases. Defense Minister Sharon ranked second in favorable news 
contexts in The New York Times; Sharon also received a considerable 
amount of unfavorable coverage, because of his indirect role in the 
Beirut massacre. Also, among noteworthy symbols in The New York Times, 
PLO Chairman Arafat recetved favorable coverage but the PLO itself 
re~-a-t-we-c-e-v-e-Hge-a,nd the symbol 11 Palestine Question 11 was 
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mentioned only four times during the entire conflict. 
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch news columns carried Begin in favorable 
light, Arafat in favorable light and Sharon in unfavorable light. Like 
The New York Times, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch also carried news in 
which the PLO was in a negative light and gave almost no consideration to 
the symbol, "Palestine Question." 
Prior to conducting this study, this writer made an effort to ensure 
objectivity in coding symbols in this analysis of content. A pilot study 
was conducted to ensure coder reliability. The pilot study showed that 
coding by two independent coders was ~jghly similar_ to this writer's 
! 
coding procedure, and indicates an absence of bias in coding symbbls. 
-
Recommendations and Conclusions 
11 You should not forget that this war (between Israel and the 
Arab States) has been going on for 40 years in this region, qnd 
the first enemy is distrust. We must restore confidence in the 
region. 11 1 
King Hassan II of Morocco, 
October 1982 
Distrust is the word to note in the above paragraph. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on for many years and the distrust 
has increased with time. Between countries in the conflict and between 
I 
I political and religious factions, the atmosphere of distrust has to be 
removed for peace to result. 
1 The media should try and understand better the parties invol~ed in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. One of the organizations that has not !been 
I 
I 
l 11Arab Leader Softens Stance On Israel, 11 St. Louis Post-Disptach, 
October 24, p. 1-4. 
very well understood by the American media is the Palestine Liberation 
I 
Organization. To take case of The New York Times and St. Louis Pbst-
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Dispatch, these two newspapers, through accounts of events, tend to portray 
the PLO in a negative light. But the newspapers should try and u~derstand 
I 
t~e goals of the PLO. The PLO is an organization working toward a homeland 
for the Palestine people and this goal should be explained intermittently. 
In reading through The New York Times and St. Louis Post-Ois~atch, 
~s writer noted that news stories in both newspapers addressed Israel 1 s 
right to exist but rarely addressed Palestine's right to exist as :a nation. 
The writer hopes that in future news would include accounts of these who 
advocate that Palestine has a right to exist as a lawful nation. 
The issue of Palestine's or Israel 1 s right to exist can be treated in 
editorial pages of both newspapers. The writer recommends that the 
newspapers attempt to present a pro-con debate in their news articles 
regarding the right to exist. 
The Palestine question, which is a central issue in the entire 
conflict, has been overlooked most of the time. A newspaper does pot 
I 
' fulfill its duty to the readers simply by reporting the ey,ents in a 
,./ ' 
conflict. The duty is better fulfilled by reporting why an event kccurred. 
I 
' 
Not many people in the United States know of the deep-rooted reasors for 
the Arab-Israeli conflict or the history behind the Palestine question. In J I 
-~uch a situation, the newspaper should provide an adequate backgroJnd of 
( 'Cf he conflict to its readers, Jnterpretati ve report i nq helps provide 
I history and background on an issue. It is recommended that the twl 
newspapers present interpretative articles on the Arab-Israeli confilict. 
I 
This writer's analysis dealt only with content gathered or prqvided 
for the two papers• news columns. She cannot draw conclusions rega\rding 
balance of, or bias in, the news, since symbol analysis_does not deal 
-
w_ith quantitativeJ!!easurements such as~mn inches pertp.i,ni .. ~ 
parties of the conflict. 
~,.., .. "~.-, .... ~,·-·---~_.., .. ~~·-· .. ~,.~"~·-----.;i.. 
One can say that prediction of symbols fell into the context of 
events. Had they not -- that is, if Israeli symbols had continued to 
override the Arab symbols in a favorable c<m:t..ext. during and after the 
/. 
massacre, one might suspect _selective reporting. ~But this was not the 
91 
--.~---
<;ase, at 1 east as one cou 1 d_ c!_etermi ne from the symbol a nal,¥S-is~_ 
Finally, this writer suggests that the Budd~Thorp symbol ana:!Ly-s+~ 
·-
technique is more tailored for "advocacy" content; i.e., editorial pages, 
opinion columns, speeches, etc. In short, for persuasive messages. Its 
function in the analysis of new columns, at least, can only serve to 
determine if the predication of symbols parallel the pattern of events, 
within reason as determined by reasonable persons. 
In other words, symbol analysis, when applied to news columns, can 
detect o~nly the boldes£.an~ unabashed bi as of a newspaper. That would I 
-.// 
o~r when a newspape_r:_~-~~~tively gathers news in obvious_cie_fj_an~_-9J_ _ 
what the events dictate, so to speak. And this rarely is the case, 
regardless of the newspaper's editorial stand. 
For symbol analysis to address the question of bias, it must be 
applied to the editorial or opinion columns. As to the claim that news 
is not placed in adequate context, due to lack of background and 
interpretation, other content analysis techniques must be utilized!. 
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APPENDIX 
SAMPLING OF CODING SHEET 
The New York Times 
Date of Article Time Period of Article 
------
Arabs 
Key 
Symbols s+ M O s- M 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
Israelis 
M 0 s-
96 
-----
M 
Key 
Symbols 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
SAMPLING OF CODING SHEET 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
Date of Article Time Period of Article 
------
Arabs 
Key 
Symbols s+ M O s- M 
1. 
2 •. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
Israelis 
M 0 
97 
-----
M 
Key 
Symbols 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
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